Däremot verkar påståendet om hemliga budskap i korsord lite komiskt. Motståndsrörelsen uppmanar öppet folk att bilda celler, från en sida i Facebook, Operación Libertad Venezuela (Operation Frihet Venezuela). De uppmanar inte till våld, utan till organisation på gräsrotsnivå, för att kunna organisera aktioner i framtiden utan att förlita sig på oppositionen, vilka de påstår är till stor del infiltrerad av, eller mutad av regimen för att spela rollen av demokratisk opposition, men i ett uppgjort val som de gått med på att förlora.

Den 27 juli 2009 avslöjades att Chávez generaler gav svenska pansarskott till terrorister, nämligen FARC. FARC är en gerilla som sysslar med knarksmuggling, terrorism och kidnappingar, under förevändning av att försöka starta en kommunistisk revolution i Colombia. Sommaren 2009 var det ännu oklart om generalerna i fråga agerat på egen hand eller “i tjänsten” så att säga. Det råder nu inte längre någon tvekan. Velásquez avslöjanden, tillsammans med de av Eladio Aponte, visar att den venezolanska regimen under Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías arbetar i ett intimt samarbete med FARC, både vad gäller kokainsmuggling, vapensmuggling, terroristverksamhet, och politiskt och propagandistiskt stöd.

I intervjun nämnde Velásquez även att FARC regelbundet håller möten på Kuba, med regimen alltså, och att Kina förser dem med vapen. Kina håller systematiskt på att öka sitt inflytande i Latinamerika, på USAs och Europas bekostnad. Även Ryssland beväpnar dessa intressen.

Som exempel på propaganda kan nämnas den svenske journalisten Dick Emanelsson, vars verksamhet gör att han i praktiken fungerar som propagandarör för FARC i Honduras, Sverige, och internationellt – även om han själv förnekar en sådan koppling (jfr det pågående fallet mot Joaquín Pérez Becerra i Colombia). Vad gäller politiskt stöd så påstod Velásquez Alvaray att en annan domare i Venezuelas Högsta Domstol, nämligen Marco Tulio Dugarte i grundlagsavdelningen, fungerar som FARCs högsta juridiska ombud.

Som stöd för sina påståenden visade Velásquez även upp en rapport från en undersökning han själv genomförde kort innan han flydde, och vilken nog bidrog till att kom i onåd. Det var en noggrann undersökning av ett brottssyndikat kallat “dvärgbandet” (banda de los enanos), vilket hade (och har) som högst chef den dåvarande vicepresidenten i Venezuela. Sammansvärjningen omfattade domare i Högsta Domstolen, åklagare och poliser. Tillsammans idkade de utpressning och använde rättsväsendet som deras verktyg. Det var för att koordinera detta brottssyndikat som vicepresidenten höll de veckovisa möten som Aponte avslöjade härom veckan.

Frågan är vad omvärlden bör göra nu när det bevisats bortom varje rimligt tvivel att Venezuela är en maffiastat. Detta går bortom korruption. Här talar vi om att det är brottslingarna som styr, att det är de värsta kriminella elementen i samhället som har statens hela säkerhetsapparat till sitt förfogande. Och inte nog med de, de har dessutom en till tänderna beväpnad gerilla att stödja sig på, plus en milis på hundratusentals man, beväpnade med militära automatvapen och tränade på Kuba i gerillakrigföring. Just nu, just nu, ligger 40 tusen unga venezolaner i träning i sådana läger på Kuba. Givetvis är avsikten att omintetgöra varje idé om att hederliga och patriotiska militärer skulle vända sina vapen mot brottssyndikatet som illegalt ockuperar presidentpalatset.

Låt mig upprepa det: Den nuvarande kriminella regimen är inte legitim. Den kom till makten 1999 genom demokratiska val, men har sedan hållit sig kvar vid makten på odemokratiska sätt (valfusk, politiska mord, terroriserande av befolkningen, konfiskation av egendom, förföljelse av politiska motståndare, politiska fångar, osv). Samtidigt har den spenderat astronomiska belopp på att köpa goodwill utomlands, och den håller sig med en propagandaapparat som överträffar allt världen hittills har skådat. Allt detta betalad med oljeinkomster, och genom att inteckna landets oljeproduktion för årtionden framåt i utbyte mot snabba pengar och vapen. Det är en plundring som saknar motstycke i världshistorien – eller nästa, i varje fall. Conquistadorernas plundring av Amerika var kanske ett snäpp värre.

Chávez ligger nu för döden på Kuba. Han styr via twitter. Maktkampen är i full gång. Likaså kampen mellan knarkkartellerna. Och den 7 oktober skall det vara presidentval. Även om Chávez borde vara förbjuden att ställa upp för omval, och trots att han troligen hinner dö innan dess, så står han ändå på valsedeln. Försvarsministern, general Rangel Silva, likaså en ledande figur i den statliga / militära knarkkartellen, har sagt klart ut att under inga omständigheter kommer regimen att lämna ifrån sig makten efter valet. Politiska observatörer som Eric Ekvall har konstaterat att valfusket är av den kalibern att det är nästan omöjligt för oppositionen att vinna. Dessutom tyder mycket på att oppositionen hellre låter sig köpas, i en uppgjord match, liksom fallet var 2006 enligt mina källor. Valets roll är då att visa att regimen är legitim och demokratisk, och oppositionen betalas rundhänt för att spela med och låtsas att det råder demokrati. Det är därför de inte säger ett pip om valfusk.

Spänn fast säkerhetsbältet. Det kan att bli en våldsam resa.

Läsvärt: Ledare i DN om Venezuela och mänskliga rättigheter. FARC-vänlig artikel i Sydsvenskan nyligen – ett exempel på terroristpropagandans genomslag i Sverige. Lars Palmgren i Ekot om situationen.

They aired Chávez (speaking from a specially designed podium to hide his health state) giving orders his underlings to gather a Council of State with instructions to advice on the modality of leaving the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), a body of OAS. There is no doubt that this announcement has a lot to do with Aponte’s revelation regarding the completely arbitrary nature of Venezuelan justice. He said straight out that “there are political prisoners in Venezuela”, and that nothing is done without the approval of Chávez personally. Another way of saying that it is a dictatorship.

Personally I found out today that general Baduin was not jailed for having opposed election fraud, a rumor I reported the other day. Rather it had to do with cocaine smuggling. While he was minister of defense he found out that over 2 tons of cocaine had been discovered on a military base under the command of general Rangel Silva. He wrote to his personal friend Hugo Chávez and politely suggested that it be investigated. Instead Baduin was slandered, deposed, thrown in prison (where he still sits), and Rangel Silva was promoted to minister of defense.

Hugo Chávez’s entire behavior is consistent with that of a cocaine addict. He shows no conscience. He abuses verbally those who don’t lick his boots. He shows no risk awareness. He openly commits immoral acts of power abuse. All of this is very obvious to any non-abusing person who observes him, but other cocaine abusers will see his behavior as perfectly normal and rational. That is why Venezuela has become a Cocaine Kingdom – it doesn’t just produce and transit drugs, it has itself become a victim to those drugs.

This victimhood has gone so far as to sell out the entire country to foreign nations. For short-term gains, Chávez has signed contracts with China and others that are extremely negative for the country in the long term. But it gets worse. His complete trust in Fidel Castro has enabled the Cuban dictatorship to take over Venezuela. The database of persons is already controlled on the communist island. Elections can be staged via an underwater cable. The secret service, G2, is managing the presidential palace in Venezuela. Cuban militaries are giving orders to the Venezuelan defense forces. They are also maneuvering to make sure their man takes over after Chávez, who is receiving all his cancer treatment on Cuba.

There can be little doubt that the Cuban regime, which is totally dependent on the petroleum income it receives from Venezuela, will do anything in its power to stay in control over the South American country. Leaving IAHCR (and thus OAS) can also be seen in that perspective, as a way to disengage Venezuela from the international community, so as to make it available for entering in a permanent union with Cuba, or in a federal state with Venezuela dissolved and only the individual states remaining. Naturally it will be controlled from Havana!

Unless the Venezuelans wake up from their (drug-induced?) slumber they will lose not just their freedom and their democracy, but their very country, the sovereignty of the nation of Simón Bolívar, and possibly its very existence. That would be a sad day indeed.

Tills nyligen var Eladio Aponte Aponte domare i Venezuelas högsta domstol. Men så vände sig lyckan för honom, han blev själv anklagad för att ha utfärdat ett ID-kort till en anklagad knarksmugglare (Walid Makled), och avsatt. Då flydde han landet och gav en intervju i Costa Rica till Miami-baserade SoiTV, en kanal ägd av en landsman till Aponte, som själv hade suttit 3 år i häktet utan rättegång. När domaren Maria Afiuni släppte denne efter internationella påtryckningar kastades hon i sin tur i fängelse.

Aponte visste mycket väl hur rättssystemet i Venezuela fungerar, eftersom han själv hade varit dess smutsiga hantlangere, varför han insåg att hans bästa chans var att fly landet, berätta allt, och ta sitt straff i ett land där rättvisan faktiskt fungerar. Han överlämnade sig till USAs “knarkpolis”, DEA, efter att han gett denna intervju. Då var utsända mördare från Hugo Chávez regim redan honom tätt i hälarna.

Aponte avslöjar också att kokainsmugglingen bedrivs av staten själv, med yttersta kontroll av själve presidenten. En president som nu praktiskt taget ligger på dödsbädden, vilket öppnar för en maktkamp. Regimens män har skapat miliser beväpnade med Kalashnikov, och antikupp-kommandon, i fruktan för en statskupp eller ett civilt uppror. Oppositionen fruktar att en av falangerna i regimen planerar en statskupp själva. Många tror inte att lugnet kommer att vara ända tills presidentvalen den 7 oktober i år.

Bakgrunden till hela affären verkar vara att Walid Makled, som Colombia utlämnade till Venezuela framför näsan på USA, sitter inne med för mycket information. Aponte har nu kommit att misstänka att han hade utsetts till syndabock. Mycket riktigt besökte riksåklagaren Makled i finkan efter Apontes intervju, varefter Makled anklagade Aponte för att vara en “drug kingpin”. De anklagelser som Aponte framförde har inte föranlett någon åtgärd i Venezuela, annat än att alla, upp till utrikesminister och president, har startat en förtalskampanj mot honom.

En sak är säker: Revolutionen äter sina egna. Den som inte respekterar andras mänskliga rättigheter kan inte förvänta sig att själv få sina respekterade.

Intervjun med Eladio Aponte finns online på video och i utskrift på spanska. Här nedan återges det mesta av den långa intervjun i min översättning. Fetstil har använts för att fästa uppmärksamhet på speciellt uppseendeväckande utsagor. Några inledande frågor om han avsättande har jag hoppat över.

Intervjun

Reportern: Hur fungerar rättsväsendet i Venezuela nu för tiden?

Domaren: Jag verkar och verkade inom dem rättsväsendet som en huvudperson. Och kanske mycket av det som händer i det nuvarande rättsväsendet förekom under mitt ansvar. Men så snart som jag insåg att de mätte mig med samma måttstock och på samma sätt som de dömer andra, sa jag mig: Detta är inte den rättvisa de hävdar, detta är inte som rättskipningen borde vara, detta är inte rätt enligt grundlagen.

Reportern: Herr Aponte, har ni någon gång blivit uppringd av någon tjänsteman eller politiker för att be er påverka utgången av en rättegång i Venezuela?

Domaren: Javisst. Från presidenten och neråt. [anm.: Chávez sa själv på TV om domare Maria Afiuni, "alltså måste vi ge maximalt straff till domaren och de som gör detta. 30 års fängelse."]

Reportern: När det gäller fallet med republikens president som ni nämner, pratade ni direkt med presidenten?

Domaren: Direkt.

Reportern: Ringde han till er?

Domaren: Till mig.

Reportern: Varför?

Domaren: Framför allt fallet med paramilitärerna i El Hatillo [anm.: det var några colombianska unga män som hade transporterats till en gård (för övrigt ägd av brodern till Maria Conchita Alonso, bland annat känd för en huvudroll i "The Running Man"), där de arresterades i maj 2004 anklagade för att vara legosoldater i en planerad statskupp].

Reportern: Fallet som kallades “los Paracachitos” på den tiden [anm.: uttrycket anspelar på fallskärmsjägare men med en ändelse som får det att betyda ungefär "fallskärms-obetydlig liten skit"].

Domaren: Det var också han som gav dem det namnet.

Reportern: Vad hände i det fallet? Varför ringde han?

Domaren: Tja, för att undersökningarna skulle utföras på ett sätt som passade regeringen.

Reportern: Exakt vad var presidentens begäran?

Domaren: Nå, jag tror, som jag ser det, att de där så kallade paramilitärerna, jag tvivlade på deras ursprung för de var okunniga pojkar, utan utbildning, några kunde inte hantera vapen, andra visste inte varför de var där, och av en ren tillfällighet stoppades bussarna av en patrull av huvudstadspolisen och så uppkom fallet. Och hur kom dessa unga män från Colombia? Varför fördes de hit?

Reportern: Med andra ord, fallet var ett montage?

Domaren: Tja, om man drar sina slutsatser så tvivlar jag inte mycket på det.

Reportern: Anser ni att det fallet kan ha varit ett montage? Ni ringdes upp av president Hugo Chávez beträffande det fallet. Men ni har inte specificerat vad det var han ville.

Domaren: Tja, jag har redan sagt det. Att utföra undersökningarna så att det visades vara något mot regeringen. Att det skulle demonstreras att det var en sådan operation.

Reportern: Bortsett från president Hugo Chávez? Hur var er relation med andra offentliga funktionärer? Åtminstone när det gäller polisutredningar ["Ministerio Público"], allmänna åklagaren ["fiscalía"], Luisa Ortega, Luisa Estela Morales [anm.: ordförande i HD], fick ni också samtal från dem för att ni skulle ingripa i något beslut?

Domaren: När det gäller Luisa Otrega, ja, jag fick mer än ett samtal. Från Luisa Estela Morales, oräkneliga.

Reportern: Vad sa de?

Domaren: När någon person skulle anklagas, när någon skulle frihetsberövas, när razzior skulle göras, för att jag skulle organisera situationen, hitta en lämplig domare för att det skulle bli gjort.

Reportern: Det vill säga, manipulera fallet?

Domaren: Ja, mer än ett fall.

Reportern: Vilket fall kommer ni ihåg som manipulerades?

Domaren: Det var många. Det enda jag kommer ihåg är ett fall i Maracaibo med en riksdagsman som kallas Mazuco [anm.: Poliskommissarie José Sánchez arresterades i september 2007 för mord, senare ställde han upp som riksdagsman och vann valet hösten 2010 från fängelset; han har nyligen tillåtits lämna fängelset för att operaras för cancer].

Reportern: Hur var det fallet?

Domaren: Tja, fallet var mer eller mindre så att de letade rätt på en fånge, satte en huva över huvudet på honom, och satte honom som vittne på att denne gentleman hade varit den som givit ordern att döda den andre.

Reportern: -och vad bad ordföranden för Högsta Domstolen om?

Domaren: Tja, just precis detta. Stödja denna situation. Och mannen [anm.: fången] belönades med att återfå sin frihet.

Reportern: Varför talar ni nu?

Domaren: Varför jag talar nu? Jag vet att de kommer att kalla mig förrädare i Venezuela på grund av detta. Och jag accepterar det. Men jag blev grymt förrådd. Jag blev grymt förolämpad. Jag blev grymt manipulerad.

Reportern: Vem förrådde er, vem manipulerade er, varför? Och varför lät ni det ske?

Domaren: Därför att jag skapade en revolutionär process. [anm.: De som verkar i den så kallade "revolutionen" accepterar som ett faktum att mänskliga rättigheter ibland måste åsidosättas i revolutionens namn; att revolutionen är viktigare än enskilda människoliv. Denna attityd kommer från högsta ort.]

Reportern: När ni säger att ni blev förrådd, vad syftar ni på?

Domaren: Tja, till exempel, det som hände i riksdagen [anm.: Aponte blev anklagad och enhälligt avsatt av riksdagen, utan någon möjlighet att bemöta anklagelserna; detta upptog inledningen av intervjun]. Det som hände med den moraliska myndigheten [anm.: ett "revolutionärt" namn på åklagarämbetet], som ger en dom utan att i grunden studera mina argument som jag gav dem. Utan såg att det kom i tuben. Att det var beslutat. Och sen skulle de skicka mig till riksdagen: Här har ni honom, gör processen kort.

Reportern: Vad hände mellan er och de höga funktionärerna i Venezuelas centrala regering, för att de skulle klippa av de nära kontakter som de hade med er, eller det förtroende som de hade för er, som gick ända till att be er om juridiska tjänster som ni har beskrivit för oss?

Domaren: Tja, jag vet faktiskt inte.

Reportern: Tror ni att det var fallet Makled, eller tror ni att det var ett annat fall?

Domaren: Jag tror… jag vet inte. Kanske det var andra fall. Kanske det var fall där jag inte spelade med utan slog dövörat till. Fråga mig inte vilka för jag kommer inte ihåg nu. Men jag tror att fallet Makled passade som hand i handske för dem för att exponera mig för allmänheten och göra slut på min prestige och ära.

Reportern: Ni är advokat. Inte en advokat vilken som helst. Ni var ordförande för brottsmålssalen i Högsta Domstolen. När ni säger att ni blev manipulerad, vill jag att ni specificerar mer hur det gick till [...] tog ni emot pengar, någon form av betalning, inte bara ni utan myndigheterna som ni bad om en tjänst?

Domaren: Tja det vet jag faktiskt inte… om det fanns pengar inblandade på den sidan. Det som hände var att de bad mig om tjänster och jag utförde dem. Och aja baja den domare som nekade att utföra dem.

Reportern: Vad hände med en domare som inte lydde?

Domaren: Han fick sparken.

Reportern: Hur många domare gav ni sparken?

Domaren: Nej, inte jag. Det gjorde den juridiska kommissionen. Men det var många.

Reportern: Bidrog ni till att mer än en fick sparken?

Domaren: Ja, jag bidrog.

Reportern: Varför?

Domaren: Därför att det är en del av den juridiska kommissionen.

Reportern: Men varför fick de sparken? Bara för att de inte följde er order?

Domaren: Inte bara ordern, därför att ordern gav inte jag personligen. Ordern kunde även komma direkt från Högsta Domstolens ordförande. Många gånger kom ordern direkt från åklagaren. Det finns en åklagare vid namn Castillo, han ringde direkt till domarna och gick så långt som till att hota dem.

Reportern: På tal om det, hur är relationen till Riksåklagaren? Fyll ut lite mer. Det finns rykten i Venezuela att det kanske finns en privilegierad grupp i åklagarämbetet [...]. Vad vet ni om det? Fyll ut mer.

Domaren: Ja det är sant att det fanns en privilegierad grupp. Och det är just de som ringer domarna. Jag tror att Castillo och Mejía ringde upp domarna och om dessa inte gjorde det som åklagaren bad om, “jag ska se till att du får sparken”. De driver ut dig.

Reportern: Och varför denna inblandning i den rättsskipande myndigheten?

Domaren: Det var den överenskommelse som fanns mellan ordföranden för Högsta Domstolen och Riksåklagaren.

Reportern: Men tog de emot pengar? Idkade de utpressning? Vad vet ni om det?

Domaren: Jag tror att de framför allt idkade utpressning mot bankfolk. Därför att när det gäller bankerna hände något mycket kuriöst. Ägarna av bankerna lämnade landet, och bara ytterst få stannade kvar. De fick bara tag på tjänstemän på lägre nivå, och det är de som sitter i fängelse nu.

Reportern: För ungefär 6 år sedan gjorde en annan domare i Högsta Domstolen, Luis Velásquez Alvaray, en mycket allvarlig anklagelse och fortfarande vet vi venezolaner inte vad som har hänt i fallet. Han talade om ett påstått gäng av dvärgar, inom rättsväsendet. Han talade också om hur knarkhandeln hade infiltrerat rättsväsendet och hade nått till många domare. Ni som just lämnat systemet, berätta för oss vad ni vet om detta? Vad har hänt under dessa 6 år?

Domaren: Ja faktiskt, ända tills nu nyligen så jobbar de så kallade dvärgarna – som alla vet vilka de är – kvar inom åklagarämbetet.

Reportern: Hur fungerar det?

Domaren: Tja det finns en mekanism. Åklagaren agerar och framför begäran till myndigheten.

Reportern: Det vill säga, om de behöver en juridisk tjänst, så utförs den åt dem? Varför?

Domaren: Jag har ingen kännedom om deras externa affärer. Jag ser bara det som de gör inom statsapparaten. Och där kommer begäran från åklagaren.

Reportern: Är det sant att domstolars beslut och domar har ett pris i Venezuela?

Domaren: I vissa fall ja.

Reportern: Kan man alltså köpa rättvisan i Venezuela med pengar?

Domaren: Kanske.

Reportern: Vad menar ni med kanske?

Domaren: Ja, i vissa fall har det gjorts. Det finns inget oberoende rättsväsende i Venezuela, alltså som en oberoende statsmakt. Det är en vanföreställning. Och jag ska säga dig varför. I slutet av varje vecka, mestadels på fredag morgon, hålls ett möte i vicepresidentkansliet, och där sammanträder vicepresidenten, vilket är den som håller i rättsskipningen i Venezuela, med Högsta Domstolens ordförande, med riksåklagaren, med riksdagens talman, med justitiekanslern, med riksrevisorn, och ibland med någon av cheferna för en av polisstyrkorna. Därifrån utgår anvisningarna om hur rättvisan skall skipas. Med andra ord, riktlinjerna för rättvisan i Venezuela utgår därifrån.

Reportern: Deltog ni i dessa möten?

Domaren: Jag deltog i flera av dem.

Reportern: Är det ett möte som äger rum varje veckoslut, på lördagar inom vicepresidentämbetet?

Domaren: Nej, på fredagar.

Reportern: Hur är det med statsmakternas oberoende i Venezuela?

Domaren: Jag tror inte det finns så mycket oberoende.

Reportern: Vad avhandlas på dessa sammanträden?

Domaren: Tja, vilka fall som är på gång, hur man skall agera. Det vill säga man gav instruktioner utifrån vad som var politiskt önskvärt.

[...]

Reportern: Tog ni aldrig emot pengar från Walid Makled?

Domaren: Nej.

Reportern: Tog ni aldrig emot pengar från knarksmugglare?

Domaren: Aldrig. Jag gjorde aldrig någon tjänst till knarksmugglare. Bara ett fall vad jag kommer ihåg. Om en major Magino. En löjtnant. Jag kommer inte ihåg så noga. Som blev arresterad i Carora med en last av kokain. Han var vice befälhavare under major Magino, drogerna hittades i hans besittning. De ringde till mig för Maginos räkning, från republikens president och neråt, för att jag skulle gynna honom. [anm.: Enligt general Peñaloza handlade det om överste Maggino, och han ger betydligt mer kött på benen.]

Reportern: Vem är denne Magino?

Domaren: En major som sedan blev befordrad till general. Överste eller general, jag vet inte. Och de sände honom som militärattaché till Brasilien.

Reportern: Och han var inblandad i knarksmugglingen?

Domaren: Tja, löjtnanten transporterade knarket till bataljonen där Magino var.

Reportern: Och vad var er inblandning i det fallet? Hur gynnade ni honom?

Domaren: Jag gynnade honom med ett föreläggande, men han släpptes inte fri.

Reportern: Vem beordrade er att göra det? Eller var det på eget initiativ?

Domaren: Nej, de ringde mig. Från presidentämbetet och neråt.

Reportern: Aha, men i det fallet…

Domaren: I detta fallet. De ringde mig från presidentämbetet.

Reportern: Vem i presidentämbetet?

Domaren: Det var en av sekreterarna eller de med anknytning till presidentämbetet. Jag tror det var Morales.

Reportern: Ni säger alltså att en av de med koppling till republikens president, till Hugo Chávez, ringde till er för att ni skulle gynna en knarksmugglare i ett misstänkt fall av knarksmuggling?

Domaren: Ja. Försvarsministern ringde mig, på den tiden var det Baduel [anm.: det var han som återinsatte Chávez som president efter att han tvingats avgå den 11 april 2002, men nu sitter han själv i fängelse, enligt general Peñaloza efter att ha rapporterat till Chávez att Rangel Silva var inblandad i denna knarkaffär, enligt annan spekulation efter att ha vägrat gå med på valfusk då Chávez förlorade folkomröstningen 2007.]. Rangel Silva ringde mig [anm.: han är nuvarande försvarsministern, och är sedan länge anklagad för att vara en "drug kingpin" av USA]. Hugo Carvajal ringde mig. En amiral ringde mig… Aguirre vill jag minnas. Med andra ord, många människor vädjade för den personen.

Reportern: Ni kommer inte ihåg detaljerna om det fallet?

Domaren: Det jag kommer ihåg är att han återlämnade knarket och blev tvungen att övernatta i en barack och det var där knarket upptäcktes.

Reportern: Knarket övernattade i en barack i det venezolanska gardet?

Domaren: Venezolansk ja, men jag tror det var armén.

Reportern: Och detta var ett beslag?

Domaren: Det var inte något beslag. Det anlände.

Reportern: Det vill säga knarket transporterades genom landet och bevakades i en barack i en venezolansk arméförläggning?

Domaren: Ja, så är det.

Reportern: Det var inte ett beslag, utan det handlade om att bevaka knark som transporterades vart? Och varifrån kom detta knark?

Domaren: Detta knark kommer från Colombia, detta var i Carora. Det kom från söder.

Reportern: Det övernattade där och sen, vart skulle det?

Domaren: Det skulle mot mitten. Mot mitten av landet.

Reportern: Och ni utfärdade det där föreläggandet för att gynna denna man.

Domaren: Ja. Det är det enda fall som jag kan minnas i vilket jag har gynnat en knarksmugglare.

Reportern: Låt oss ta om det, presidentämbetet bad er alltså att ni skulle gynna detta fall av knarksmuggling. Vem mer? Ge mig namnen är ni snäll, detta är viktigt. Vem mer ringde er?

Domaren: Carvajal, Rangel Silva.

Reportern: Vem är Carvajal?

Domaren: Han är chef för DIM [anm.: den militära säkerhetstjänsten], Henry Rangel Silva var chef för DISIP [anm.: säkerhetspolisen], Baduel som var försvarsminister, amiral Aguirre som är från presidentens försvarsstab.

Reportern: Vad exakt sa de?

Domaren: Tja, att detta är en hygglig kille, att presidenten är mycket intresserad av fallet.

Reportern: Men visste de att han hade knark i en arméförläggning?

Domaren: Javisst! Hur skulle de inte kunna veta det? Det verkar som om denne Magino var adjutant åt presidentens mor, att det var kopplingen.

Reportern: Och det kunde visas att denne herre hade fört in knarket och att han skulle föra det vidare.

Domaren: Jag gav honom föreläggandet [anm. termen brukar betyda att släppas fri i väntan på rättegång, med reseförbud] och åklagaren lade ner undersökningen. Nu minns jag att åtalet senare avfärdades.

Reportern: Hur länge sedan var detta?

Domaren: Det bör vara en fyra – fem år sedan. Alcalá Cordones var enligt min uppfattning knarkkungen i Venezuela, tillsammans med Reverol.

Reportern: Vilken Reverol? Direktören för ONA?

Domaren: Direktören för ONA.

Reportern: Alltså, ni påstår att direktören för ONA, den nationella myndigheten för knarkbekämpning, skulle vara inblandad i knarksmuggling?

Domaren: Han står mycket nära Alcalá Cordones.

Reportern: Hr ni någon typ av bevis för det ni påstår? För det är mycket allvarligt.

Domaren: Det är allvarligt.

Reportern: Och vilka bevis har ni för att det är sant?

Domaren: Jag ska leta. Just nu har jag dem inte.

Reportern: Men varför anser ni att denne herre, befälhavare för en militärregion, för en division, tillsammans med direktören för det nationella kontoret för knarkbekämpning, kan vara kopplade till knarksmugglingen?

Domaren: Titta på statistiken över den internationella knarksmugglingen och se var den största mängden knark lämnar Venezuela. Jag tvivlar inte på att det är Puerto Cabello.

Reportern: Vad kan ni få tag på?

Domaren: Tja, något som pekar ut dessa personer.

Reportern: Har ni någon gång haft något att göra med, eller kännedom om, en direkt relation mellan regeringen och FARC i Colombia? [anm.: FARC är en kommunistisk terrorgrupp som livnär sig på kidnappningar och knarksmuggling.]

Domaren: Den stunden kom då vi fick instruktion, framför allt i den militära åklagarmyndigheten, att när det gällde alla dessa personer så skulle vi inte ens se dem.

Reportern: När ni jobbade i den militära åklagarmyndigheten, hade ni hand om fall som Usón,

Domaren: Ja

Reportern: Fallet Baduel,

Domaren: Det också

Reportern: Fallet Poggioli,

Domaren: Nej, Baduel hade inte jag

Reportern: Ni hade inte det, men ni hade Usón.

Domaren: Usón, ja.

Reportern: Blev det fallet manipulerat?

Domaren: Ja, det fallet blev manipulerat.

Reportern: Fick ni någon presidentorder, eller någon order från den verkställande makten, för att handla annorlunda gentemot vad den militära åklagarmyndigheten annars skulle ha agerat?

Domaren: Ja.

Reportern: Vad sa de?

Domaren: Tja, att vi måste anklaga eller åtala.

Reportern: Varför gjorde ni det?

Domaren: Uhhh…

Reportern: Varför gjorde ni det??

Domaren: Jag beordrades.

Reportern: Vad skulle ha hänt ifall ni inte hade utfört era order?

Domaren: Jag skulle ha varit ute.

Reportern: Var det det enda som motiverade er att följa dessa order?

Domaren: Javisst! Jag är, eller rättare var yrkesmilitär.

Reportern: Hur känner ni er nu i denna stund, efter att ni enligt egen utsaga har manipulerat rättsskipningen i Venezuela, när nu ert eget öde vilar i rättsväsendets händer?

Domaren: Tja, som jag sa, jag vet vad som väntar mig… och det som väntar mig är inget bra.

Reportern: Hur känner ni er med personer som förlorat sin frihet, familjen till personer som blev kastade i fängelse, vad skulle ni säga till dessa personer som ni i vissa fall frihetsberövade – för att följa order eller av vad skäl det vara månde – vad skulle ni säga till dessa familjer, som tittar på er nu över hela landet, vad skulle ni säga till Venezuela som ser er erkänna att ni manipulerade rättvisan?

Domaren: Jag skulle säga till Venezuela att det är dags att återhämta sig, så att vi inte fortsätter att begå misstag som i det förflutna, att vi tänker på en mera lovande framtid, mera demokratisk och med mera frihet, och jag som man, som venezolan, jag tar mitt ansvar och om jag gjorde fel, om jag gjorde fel så tar jag på mig skulden; och om jag måste straffas så tar jag mitt straff, men jag tänker inte betala för ett brott som jag inte begått.

Reportern: Vad syftar ni på, för ni erkänner ju att ni visst manipulerade rättvisan…

Domaren: På fallet… nej, nej, jag syftade på fallet Makled. [anm.: Aponte avsattes för att han påstås ha utfärdat en ID-handling till Makled i namn av den militära åklagarmyndigheten.]

Reportern: En fråga, enligt er uppfattning, finns det i nutid politiska fångar i Venezuela?

Domaren: Ja, det finns personer där ordern är att inte släppa dem fria, framför allt poliskommissarierna [anm.: de poliser i Caracas som räddade livet på civilpersoner som besköts av krypskyttar utanför presidentpalatset den 11 april 2002, då ungefär en miljon personer tågade dit genom hela staden, och vilket resulterade i att Chávez tvingades avgå. Medan dessa poliser sitter i fängelse går dussintals personer fria, fastän det finns videobevis på att de sköt på demonstranterna. Denna händelse kallas av Chávez för en militärkupp. Det myteri som militärerna gjorde var naturligtvis helt korrekt och berömvärt.].

Reportern: Vem gav ordern och vad är ordern och vad…

Domaren: Ordern kommer från presidentämbetet och neråt, det råder ingen tvekan, i Venezuela görs ingenting utan presidentens godkännande. [anm.: I klartext säger han alltså att Venezuela är ett envälde, en diktatur.]

Reportern: Fick ni order att inte släppa Simonovis? [anm.: en av poliserna som sitter som politisk fånge]

Domaren: Uhh…

Reportern: Simonovis, poliserna den 11 april, vad var ordern, berätta!

Domaren: Vad var inställningen i brottsmålssalen [i HD], den var att bekräfta allt som som redan gjorts, detta är kort sagt att alltså acceptera att dessa herrar inte kunde släppas fria, att rättvisan vände dem ryggen. Vad skulle jag säga till familjerna då, håll hoppet vid liv och kämpa för det ni tror på och förtjänar, de måste kämpa.

Reportern: Upplever ni att regeringen vänder er ryggen just nu?

Domaren: Tja, jag tror att de har vänt mig ryggen en längre tid, men att jag inte har märkt det.

Reportern: När började regeringen vända ryggen åt er?

Domaren: Jag tror att det är över ett år sedan.

Reportern: Varför?

Domaren: Tja, jag kanske inte längre var användbar, eller de kanske letade efter någon som var mera, mera medgörlig med vad de ville göra.

[...]

Reportern: För att avsluta intervjun, är statsmakterna i Venezuela oberoende?

Domaren: Inte alls.

Reportern: Rättsväsendet i Venezuela?

Domaren: Varken rättsväsendet eller den verkställande makten, ingen av statsmakterna.

Reportern: Finns det politiska fångar i Venezuela?

Domaren: Det finns politiska fångar i Venezuela.

Reportern: Fallet Afiuni? [anm.: domaren som spärrades in på 30 år för att ha släppt en fånge fri mot Chávez order, därför att hon åklagaren aldrig infann sig till rättegången]

Domaren: Samma sak, ett mycket politiskt och symboliskt fall.

Reportern: Hon är domare och advokat just som ni, hon tittar säkert på denna intervju nu, vad skulle ni säga till just henne?

Domaren: Att hon är en mycket modig kvinna och det är jurister som hon som väl representerar rättsväsendet.

___

När jag hör honom tala påminns jag om uttrycket “sent skola syndarna vakna”. Men denne syndare har vaknat, så låt det bli andra till varnagel. I ett system där inte människor respekteras går ingen säker. Ingenting kan rättfärdiga det som görs i revolutionens namn i Venezuela, lika lite som på Kuba.

I svenska media rapporteras i stort sett ingenting om detta (ex: DN).

The opposition in October is Henrique Capriles Radonski, from the unity group, MUD. A poll released the other day reports that Chávez will win by 53%, 19% more than Capriles Radonski. The regime portrays the opposition as desperate, and accuses the “USA-supported right” of planning to carry out a military coup d’état.

To prevent such a coup, an anti-coup command has now been created. It is under the command of the “chairman of PSUV”, which is kind of an interesting way to put it, since PSUV is a political party and not a branch of government. The chairman is Hugo Chávez, but since the anti-coup command is not expected to be called upon until after he dies, the person of interest is the vice chairman, Diosdado Cabello. He would be the one commanding the “anti-coup” forces of the party.

The foreign powers with most interest in Venezuela are Cuba, Iran, Russia, and China. Cuba cannot afford to lose the economic support from Venezuela, and has infiltrated all branches of government, including all parts of the military. They effectively control Venezuela. Iran to a lesser extent also depends on Venezuela for getting around the sanctions, while Russia and China mostly are interested in that the next regime honors the agreements (which are very favorable to those countries; basically Chávez sold Venezuelan resources on the cheap, in return for personal power).

Following the Cuban model, Chávez had already created militias heavily armed with automatic weapons. Their purpose is to “defend the revolution”, and one may presume that their one and only purpose is to render military coups impossible.

As for the poll cited earlier, Henrique Capriles feels confident that he will win, and says that he is “laughing” at the poll result. A campaign coordinator whom I interviewed said that “among the poor, Chávez is already losing”. Knowing that in Venezuela the justice sits in the sharp tip of the spear, the pollster was most likely given an offer he couldn’t refuse for publishing that result. It wouldn’t surprise me if all the figures are accurate, but that they have search-and-replaced Chávez with Capriles in the report, and vice versa. Doing it that way makes it much more difficult to discover the fraud, than if the figures had just been invented.

Planning for a Coup

There are only two handbooks available for how to plan and execute a military coup (“Coup d’État – a practical handbook” and “How to stage a military coup – from planning to execution”). I have read them both, with Venezuela in mind. Let me tell you, the conditions just aren’t there for staging a military coup in Venezuela in 2012. There are several reasons, the most important being that Cuba is effectively ruling Venezuela, meaning that the coup would have to be staged in Havana, Cuba, to be successful. Another deterrent are the militias, which undoubtedly would lead to a species of civil war if a coup was to be carried out.

So why did Diosdado Cabello create the anti-coup command?

To get an idea we have to look closer at the power structure of the regime. Diosdado Cabello is also the speaker of the parliament, and as a former military he was involved in Chávez’s 1992 military coup attempt. He has a lot of actual power, and can count on support by significant parts of the military. He has been rather credibly accused of being deeply involved in the drug-smuggling business, conducted by a number of leading militaries, including the minister of defense Rangel Silva (google Eliado Aponte Aponte and watch the interview, in Spanish of course).

The PSUV aristocracy has been said to also contain ideologues, who are more into socialism than cocaine. The leaders among those are allegedly the foreign minister Nicolás Maduro, and vice president Elias Jaua. Neither of these can count on support from the military, especially not Jaua, according to pundits.

The common wisdom is that the civilian/socialist, and military/narco branches of PSUV will fight for power once Chávez dies. The anti-coup command should probably be seen in this context, the internal power struggle. But how would Cabello benefit from it? Allow me to outline a possible scenario.

The Coup Scenario

Some time after midnight small groups of soldiers, who are part of the conspiracy, receive their “go ahead” order. Traveling in civilian cars they drive to their designated targets: Nicolas Maduro, Elías Jaua, and other key figures in the government and PSUV. One group is deployed to the residence of Diosdado Cabello, but he is not at home. They kidnap (“arrest” in their vocabulary) their targets and whisk them off to a secret location, where they are being held incommunicado for the duration of the active phase of the coup.

At about the same time, saboteurs set out to take out all of the information infrastructure except the main opposition radio and TV stations in the capital. Among the targets is TeleSur, the international satellite TV channel that is controlled by the regime’s minister of information. They don’t destroy it permanently, they just cut some cables to keep it offline a couple of hours.

Other groups deploy in full military gear from Fuerte Tiuna, the military base in the capital, after first locking up all Cubans in their units. They spread out and set up road blocks to prevent enforcements from arriving, and they make sure no runway at the airport can be used. If they can’t take the airport due to heavy defenses, they just park some armored cars on the runway, and deploy some machine guns around to prevent the defenses from reaching the vehicles.

The largest unit moves to the presidential palace, “Miraflores”, with armored vehicles, but are met by a much larger force why they chose not to engage.

At this time the anti-coup command is deployed and moves to undo the damage caused by the saboteurs. Diosdado Cabello goes out on live radio and TV and explains that the “USA-supported right” has attempted to carry out a military coup during the night, but has failed. He declares a state of emergency and curfew, assumes all power since several key persons of the government are missing, cancels the October elections, and arrests all leading opposition persons accusing them of being behind the coup. Finally he explains their desperate act by the fact that they “knew” that they were going to lose the elections in a landslide, as evidenced by the opinion polls.

This is a conceivable scenario. It may well be that something like that will happen. However, it will only appear to happen that way. In reality, the “military coup” will most likely be a false flag operation, staged by Diosdado Cabello himself through trusted intermediaries. To cover his role he will be on the list of persons to arrest, but he will make sure to be in a safe place from which to lead the anti-coup command. This scheme has several nice benefits: He gets rid of the internal competition for power in PSUV, at the same time as he gets rid of the political opposition. He becomes a new Fidel in Latin America. Chess mate.

Paragraph 1. The first ten Amendments of the Constitution shall be named collectively the “Bill of Human Rights” and the word “person” shall refer to all living human beings from the moment they are born. Comment: Since the 19th Century a Supreme Court precedent has given corporations the same constitutional rights as human beings. This article is designed to undo that precedent and return the power to the people.

Paragraph 2. Congress shall make no law relating to specific cases. All laws shall be of a general and universal nature, and apply equal for all cases where the circumstances are similar. Neither a chamber of Congress, nor an individual member of Congress, shall express an opinion on a specific case, nor on the application of bills decided on by congress once they have become law. The specifics shall be formulated in regulations emitted by the administrative agency charged with implementing the law. Comment: By removing the possibility for congressmen to influence specific cases, a significant reason for bribing them is eliminated.

Paragraph 3. An administrative court system shall be established by Congress. Individuals and legal persons shall be able to turn to this administrative court system to challenge the implementation of regulations based on laws, or the implementation of regulations in actual administrative practice, including in individual cases. Decisions shall be appealable to Appellate Administrative Courts, and the highest level of appeal shall be the President’s cabinet, subject to their approval of attending the case. Comment: This will replace the practice of turning to ones member of Congress in case of trouble with the federal government, a practice that invites corruption.

Paragraph 4. Every member of Congress has a right to an up or down vote on the floor of the chamber, in the same session, on all proposals submitted before noon on the 30th calendar day since the inauguration of a regular session of Congress. Comment: This is designed to force Congress to function better than today, by removing the possibility to indefinitely stall proposals. It removes the possibility for a single member to exert undue influence, and thus it eliminates the possibility for special interests to bribe a single member to do just that.

Paragraph 5. All legislative proposals intended to become law must be reviewed for constitutionality in its final form before an up or down vote is taken on the floor of a chamber of Congress. This review shall be made by a Constitutional Board, consisting of 6 members all holding research doctorate degrees in Law, proposed by the House and approved by the Senate for 12-year staggered terms with one replacement every second year. The board can only make written statements and may only express opinions on legislative proposals as a group. The board may not express opinions on bills that have already become law, that being the exclusive privilege of the judicial branch. Comment: This is designed to both fight corruption, and improve the function of Congress, and improve the judicial situation of the country by eliminating the possibility of unconstitutional bills becoming law. Since the final draft must be reviewed, it excludes the kind of last-minute additions that are the main method by which pork is inserted into bills as payback to campaign contributors.

Paragraph 6. The President of the union shall appoint a cabinet of no less than 5 and no more than 20 members, who shall be approved by the Senate, having the right to an up or down vote within 20 days after the nomination, counting only the weekdays when the Senate is in session. All decisions shall be taken by the cabinet in quorum with at least half of the cabinet members apart from the President required at the meeting to have a quorum. The only exception is in the case of a declared war or a state of emergency, in which case the President can decide on urgent matters alone. As soon as circumstances permit, but not later than 72 hours after the decision, the decision and the justification for it and the nature of its adoption shall be communicated to the members of the cabinet who were not present when it was taken. The Vice President shall be included as a cabinet member without portfolio. In the case of an equal number of votes for and against a proposal, the President has the deciding vote. Comment: This is designed to speed up the taking office of the new administration after a presidential election, as well as to make the executive decision-making more democratic, and less prone to errors of judgment of a single person.

Paragraph 7. Members of Congress represent all the people of the United States, and they all have a right to a reasonable contact with any member of Congress who is involved in a committee that deals with the policy issue that the person wants to discuss. This right extends to interest groups formed by individuals, provided they have only individuals as members, that the group has a democratically elected leadership according to the principle one member – one vote, and that the group does not accept donations from for-profit organizations. Corporations, corporate interest groups, or lobbyists employed by corporations may not discuss policy with members of congress in closed meetings, only in meetings open for the public. Comment: This is another way to make corruption harder.

Paragraph 8. Political parties have a right to a tax-funded campaign contribution that is proportional to their result in the previous election of the same kind, i.e., for the House, for the Senate, and for the President. The result shall be counted as the nationwide percentage of the votes, not as the seats won. The size of the contribution shall be proposed by the President before each election, and given an up or down vote by the Senate within 20 session days. The Parties shall be in charge of distributing this money to their candidates’ campaigns as they see fit, but ultimately it is the Parties themselves through their chairman who is responsible for making sure the public funds are used in accordance with election law. This shall be the only financing for the general election campaign except for new parties since they are not receiving any funds. Comment: This complements the measures against corruption by providing another way to finance a campaign.

Paragraph 9. Public servants in a position to make decisions on individual cases in which a regulation based on a law is implemented, have a personal responsibility to make sure the regulation and the law are being implemented justly and fairly as the lawmaker intended. Comment: This is designed to assure that the implementation of the laws are not arbitrary, as a complement to the administrative court system, to which the civil servants may have to answer if they misbehave. It is thus designed to prevent them from being corrupted instead of the politicians.

Paragraph 10. Cabinet members in charge of [key secretaries, maybe the 5 main ones] will appear individually before the House to answer questions at least once per congressional session, but no more than once per month. Comment: The purpose is to increase the transparency in governing, and to make the elected representatives more able to follow up on how laws are implemented.

Paragraph 11. Every U.S. citizen shall be entitled to have free access to official documents, in order to encourage the free exchange of opinion and the availability of comprehensive information. The right of access to official documents may be restricted only if restriction is necessary with regard to: the security of the Union or its relations with a foreign nation or an international organization; the central fiscal, monetary or currency policy of the Union; the inspection, control or other supervisory activities of a public authority; the interests of preventing or prosecuting crime; the economic interests of the public institutions; the protection of the personal or economic circumstances of individuals; or the preservation of animal or plant species. Comment: This is to further transparency in governing. The wording is taken from the Swedish constitution where this provision has been seen as a central tenet since 1766.

That is my proposal, a draft. Note that there is not one single measure to end corruption, but a plethora of changes designed to circumvent the different practices and cheats that are being used, at the same time making it both difficult and rather meaningless to bribe a politician. I hope to receive comments, although I know it is hard to register (go to bottom, there is a tiny link; sorry for having to do that but the spam was killing the blog and I haven’t had the time to find a better solution). You can also comment on Facebook.

¿Qué significa? Significa que la constitución venezolana de 1961 todavía sigue en vigor, y que el pueblo venezolano legitimamente puede levantarse contra el régimen de Chávez y derrocarlo, ya que la constitución de 1961 no solamente les da el derecho, pero les da el deber de hacerlo.

Por el resto del mundo significa que les sirviera mejor no tratar el régimen de Chávez, ya que no es legítimo. Un nuevo régimen democrático puede censurar a la OEA y la ONU por no haber defendido la democracia en Venezuela. Como sabemos, el único país que ha detenido este tipo de autogolpe del siglo XXI es Honduras, pero siempre hay la esperanza de que los pueblos en las democracias caídas se levanten. Ahora cuando el pueblo en Cuba está despertando, dejando el miedo atrás, solo es una cuestión de tiempo hasta que todos estas dictaduras en America Latina caen.

Además, la salud de Chávez puede acabar con su vida y su régimen golpista en cualquier momento. El hombre propone pero Dios dispone.

The only ones denying this are the “exceptionalists“, those who claim that USA is exceptional, that it does not follow the pattern because it is absolutely unique in the history of the world. Their assertion of US exceptionalism should be exposed for what it is: A primitive psychological knee-jerk reaction to the speaker’s own sense of inadequacy and insecurity.

If you don’t respect yourself, you cannot respect others. To respect yourself requires self-confidence, to be secure in yourself. I believe that USA as a country is short on self-confidence, and then notably the conservatives in the US. In what appears to be a psychological compensation mechanism, they therefore engage in a discourse of American exceptionalism, in over-the-top self-confidence. Needless to say this makes them look utterly ridiculous to outside observers, so it doesn’t contribute to solving the underlying condition of insecurity. For others to deal with Americans they have to understand that they aren’t so self-confident as they appear, that they actually are much more full of fears than most other nations.

In international relations this lack of balls is compensated by creating an empire, the ultimate phallic symbol.  USA is obsessed with being in control. The creation of the global empire, aimed at controlling every possible military adversary, compensates for the fundamental sense of insecurity. Once created, the empire has been used and abused also to control and manipulate other countries, which leads to resentment and undermines the goal of creating security.

Let me return to the issue and analyze what may happen at the fall of the US empire.

During the recent political turmoil in Washington about raising the debt ceiling, some called for cutting programs that benefit those of lower income, and others called for raising more taxes from the rich. But none of the major groups called for cutting the vast spending that goes for maintaining the Empire. That topic was apparently taboo.

The United States of America is a federal republic. However, the US of A is also an empire. It’s possible to be in favor of one and against the other.

USA has two faces overseas: The diplomatic force, and the military. The military is effectively acting as a parallel diplomatic mission in many countries. The military is spread out over much of the planet, with about 800 bases overseas, plus the navy with several fleets, each one a complete military force with navy, “air force” (aircraft carriers), and “army” (marines).

What typically happened to the predecessors in the role was that the expansion face was followed by a consolidation face, which turned out to be increasingly expensive and eventually drained the resources of the empire. The Roman Empire was ultimately defeated by some barbaric tribes, not by a larger empire, as its resources for defense were depleted. Which brings us back to the US’s debt crisis, and the fact that the Empire is off the table in the discussions.

A possible scenario is that the US economy deteriorates, perhaps by the Great Recession becoming a double-dipped recession and converting into the “Great Depression 2.0″, from the refusal to decrease the vast spending on the military that is required in order to maintain the Empire (about half the federal budget). Such a situation would force either a peaceful dismantling of the empire, by lowering the ambition level either in its geographical extent or in capabilities; or, it might trigger the use of the military in a new war in an effort to deflect attention from the real issue, and justify its existence.

If the enemies of the US build up their arsenals and create a convincing military threat, then a large war might result, which would save the empire for another few decades – provided of course that it wins the war and destroys the economies of its enemies more than it destroys its own economy. But isn’t the point of having an empire of this kind to avoid a war?

The only good way out of this situation seems to be to decrease the costs associated with the Empire. It requires some fundamental changes of attitude. USA must start dealing with other countries in such a way that shared security is created, and the empire becomes superfluous.

At the same time, other countries, including Latin America, should prepare for the new reality by treating the US as equal, and by contributing to changing the rhetoric. Responsible leaders of Latin America should maintain strict sovereignty visa-vi Washington, never falling on their knees no matter what is offered. How can Washington learn to treat Tegucigalpa as equal, if Tegucigalpa doesn’t treat Washington as equal? The responsibility for changing the nature of the relationship rests as heavily on the shoulders of Latin American leaders as it rests on US leaders. Needless to say, Latin American leaders should also steer well clear of Castro and Chávez, since they are populists and tyrants who only bring misery by trying to exploit the weakness of USA.

I artikeln “Elektroniskt ID-kort à la Kuba” (Cédula electrónica a la cubana) skriver den venezolanska oppositionstidningen El Nacional att en avhoppad ingenjör avslöjat att det ingåtts ett hemligt avtal mellan Chávez Venezuela och Kuba, enligt vilket Kuba skall framställa de nya elektroniska ID-korten för venezolanerna. Det betyder att det har full tillgång till den venezolanska persondatabasen, och kan ändra den som de vill. Till yttermera visso har venezolanska experter enligt avtalet inte har rätt till insyn i vad kubanerna gör.

Detta betyder naturligtvis att Kuba nu kan skapa nya falska venezolanska identiteter för vem de vill, inklusive terrorister. En avhoppad kubansk agent avslöjade på TV i Miami att Kuba rutinmässigt ger venezolanska identitetshandlingar till sina agenter i Venezuela, och det är känt att terrorister från Hezbollah och ETA också fått dem.

Vad värre är, det ger Havanna en möjlighet att manipulera utgången av valen i Venezuela, genom att ta bort regimmotståndare från valrullorna så att de inte tillåts rösta, och istället lägga till massvis med imaginära chavistas. Att så redan har skett är känt; vid kontroller som oberoende experter gjort i Venezuela har man enligt uppgift hittat expempel på att tusen röstande har bott på samma address. Lägg därtill att det finns ett stort motstånd i regimen mot effektiv oberoende valövervakning. Till exempel vägrar Caracas konsekvent att släppa in den interamerikanska kommissionen för mänskliga rättigheter (samtidigt som Chávez kritiserat andra länder, t ex Honduras under Micheletti, fastän Micheletti öppnade dörrarna för den kommissionen).

Detta är bara ett graverande exempel på hur Hugo Chávez sålt ut Venezuelas oberoende till Fidel Castro och Kuba. I presidentpalatset i Caracas, Miraflores, finns en propagandaavdelning som enligt uppgift från dissidenter helt sköts av kubaner, medlemmar av G2, den kubanska säkerhetstjänsten. Dissidenter i Venezuela uppger att det finns 60.000 kubanska agenter i landet, många av dem militärer (härom veckan landsteg 1.500 soldater, rapporterat av både dissidenter på Kuba och i Venezuela, med okänt uppdrag och mål). Som jämförelse finns det nu “bara” 50.000 amerikanska soldater i Irak, ett land med fler invånare.

Det politiska inflytandet av Kuba i Venezuela kan knappast överskattas. När Chávez opererades i juni valde han att göra det på Kuba, och stannade där i konvalesens längre än vad Venezuelas grundlag tillåter presidenten att vara frånvarande utan att svära in en ställföreträdande. Då oppositionen i parlamentet klagade svarade Chávez från Havanna att han inte var utomlands, utan i “stor-fosterlandet”, “la gran patria“. Den som borde ha blivit insvuren var givetvis vicepresident Jaua, och efter honom kommer i successionsordningen talmannen, Soto Rojas. Men ingen av dem har tydligen tillräckligt förtroende, för istället började Hugo Chávez bror, Adán, föras fram som en möjlig efterträdare, helt i strid med successionsordningen. Men det var länge sedan Hugo brydde sig om grundlagen, han styr som envåldshärskare och verkar inte lyssna på någon – utom Fidel Castro, då. Nå, en befogenhet gav han i alla fall Jaua, och det var att expropriera egendom(!).

Trotskist

Det var år 2007, då han svor in sin regering, som Chávez uttalade att han var trotskist. Leon Trotsky bröt som bekant med Stalin därför att Stalin ville konsolidera kommunismen i Sovjetunion först, och först därefter exportera den. Trotsky ansåg att man istället först skulle ta makten i alla stora länder (och då var det fritt fram att infiltrera andra partier för att därigenom få makt, ändamålen helgar medlen), och först därefter – då makten är säkrad – avslöja att den egentliga planen hela tiden var att införa global kommunism.

Att Chávez bekände sig vara trotskist verkar dock ha gått näsan förbi de flesta. Men hans agerande stämmer med hans ord. Tillsammans med Castro skapade han ALBA, en allians av latinamerikanska stater som uppgavs vara ett ekonomiskt samarbete, men som snart visade sig vara ett politiskt projekt mot USA och Europa, och som sen till och med började omvandlas till ett militärt samarbete mot väst. Venezuelas oljepengar används, enligt trovärdiga uppgifter, till att finansiera presidentkandidater i Latinamerika, och till att muta presidenter genom de så kallade ALBA-lånen. Dessa är upplagda så att landet köper olja av Venezuela, och säljer det till befolkningen, men istället för att betala Venezuela hela köpeskillingen så får presidenten låna 50% på över 20 år.

Dessa pengar hamnar utanför budgeten, och kan användas till ett projekt för att ändra grundlagen så att presidenten kan bli omvald. För att komma runt den normala processen för att ändra grundlagen har man hållt konstituerande grundlagsförsamligar, till vilka endast regimtrogna kallats. Denna typ av statskupp har genomförts i Venezuela av Chávez, i Bolivia av Evo Morales, och i Ecuador av Rafael Correa, men utan att omvärlden reagerat. Det första land där strategin stoppades var i Honduras då Manuel Zelaya försökte sig på den, men hindrades då hans partikamrat Roberto Micheletti vägrade vika en tum för påtryckingarna att rucka på lagen. Men omvärlden förstod fortfarande inte utan kallade försvaret av den demokratiska grundlagen i Honduras en militärkupp. Ytterligare en vinst för den castro-chavistiska propagandan.

Quisling

Många utomlands tror att det är Chávez som står bakom detta projekt, men venezolanska dissidenter hävdar att han bara är en marionett för Fidel Castro, hans politiska idol sedan unga år. Chávez gick in i Venezuelas armé som infiltratör, tillsammans med många andra. Kuba misslyckats på 60-talet med att ta makten i Venezuela – det rika oljelandet – med hjälp av direkt invasion, och med hjälp av gerilla i landet (nuvarande talmannen stred enligt uppgift i sin ungdom i en pro-kubansk gerilla mot Venezuelas armé). Senare infiltrerades militären för att ta makten i en civil-militär kupp. Denna del av Venezuelas historia har behandlats ingående av fd generaler i Venezuela på sina respektive bloggar: general Carlos Peñaloza, fd arméchef, i Puesto del Combate, och general Angel Vivas, i Escritos del General Vivas. De har beskrivit hur Fidel Castro personligen vid ett längre besök i Caracas år 1989 mötte anhängare och förde in militär materiel till krypskyttar i Venezuela. Vid det laget höll det kommunistiska blocket på att falla samman, och Kuba var i desperat behov av en annan källa till understöd från utlandet. Venezuela med sina oljerikedomar var en perfekt kandidat som lydstat.

Då de väntade protesterna mot president Carlos Andrés Perez åtstramningspaket inträffade bara några veckor senare var emellertid inte de militära infiltratörerna beredda. Krypskyttarna initierade emellertid sin del av planen, och besköt militären då den sändes ut för att hålla ordning vid de upplopp som hade börjat. Det ledde till en eldstrid mellan militär och krypskyttar, enligt general Peñaloza som själv deltog i att nedkämpa en krypskytt. Propagandan lyckades emellertid vända det till att presidenten beordrat armén att beskjuta civila, och händelsen kom att kallas El Caracazo, blodbadet i Caracas.

Tre år senare, 1992, gjorde Chávez ett försök till militärkupp, med motiveringen att presidenten inte var legitim efter att ha beordrat El Caracazo (Chávez hade själv inte deltagit i händelserna eftersom han sjukanmält sig den dagen). Detta var, enligt Peñalozas analys, det andra försöket. Det första hade misslyckats pga att de militära infiltratörerna inte var beredda, och detta andra misslyckades därför att det saknade civilt stöd. Chávez hamnade i fängelse.

Redan 1994 blev han emellertid frisläppt eftersom det fanns en högljudd propagandakampanj som försvarade honom. Då han kom ut började han omedelbart att resa land och rike runt för att samla anhängare. År 1998 ställde han upp i presidentvalen och blev vald. Redan samma år han svors in, 1999, arrangerade han en konstituerande grundlagsförsamling och lät anta en ny grundlag (att proceduren stred mot befintlig grundlag såg de juridiska instanserna mellan fingrarna med). Därefter började han nationalisera tillgångar och ställa statens resurser i politikens tjänst, för att kunna få resurser till att tillsätta vänligt sinnade presidenter också i andra länder.

Hjärnan bakom denna strategi, som utvecklats under årtionden, är uppenbarligen Fidel Castro och inte Hugo Chávez. Genom att låta Chávez framstå som sin egen man doldes Castros roll, och Venezuela kunde få sympati i väst för sin “nya” form av “demokratisk socialism”. Först gradvis, efter många år, började Chávez tala om kommunism istället för socialism, och kontakterna med Kuba skedde allt mer inför öppen ridå. År 2009 hade Castro genom Chávez samlat så mycket stöd i Latinamerika att de kunde få 1962 års sanktioner mot Kuba hävda i Organisationen för Amerikanska Stater, och bara månader senare stängde OAS av Honduras för att ha stoppat presidentens försök att kullkasta grundlagen.

Detta är naturligtvis en verklighetsbeskrivning som strider i viss mån mot den som är gängse vad gäller Latinamerika och Chávez. Propagandan från G2, vilken prånglas ut i allt från sociala medier och bloggar till satellit-TV-kanalen TeleSur (där Chávez informationsminister är direktör, för övrigt), fokuserar på att förstärka en chablonbild av Latinamerika som en efterbliven kontinent där en rik och samvetslös överklass förtrycker de fattiga och urbefolkningen. Genom att skapa den ramen kan de få de flesta journalistrar och reportrar att se mellan fingrarna på fakta, och ursäkta allt som inte stämmer med normala västerländska normer som ett utslag av denna efterblivenhet och klassförtryck. Genom att också använda nyspråk har man länge lyckats få väst att inte se det som är framför deras näsa: En gigantisk nermontering av demokratin i Latinamerika. Demokratin fram till 1999 i Venezuela kallas av Chávez för diktatur, och hans egen diktatur kallar han för demokrati.

I realiteten är alltså Venezuela redan en lydstat till Kuba, även om det enligt informerade källor finns de inom regeringen som motsätter sig detta. Om Chávez dör snart till följd av den cancer han säger sig ha, så blir det en maktkamp mellan Havanna och Caracas. Men oavsett hur det går så är demokratin redan död. Valen i december 2012 är bara en illusion.

Samtidigt är Venezuela fyllt av knarksmugglande gerilla och terrorister, som där fått en fristad. Om en öppen maktkamp skulle utlösas så finns risken att de väljer att gripa in för att öka graden av kaos, och försvåra för ordning och reda att etableras.

Den 5 juli var det 200 år sedan Venezuela förklarade sig självständigt. Landet befinner sig nu utan tvekan i den mörkaste stunden i sin historia, och den skyldige heter Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías. Hans förräderi gjorde ett av Latinamerikas rikaste länder till en underdånig lydstat till en diktatur, och landets ekonomi balanserar nu på avgrundens brant trots att de enligt färska uppgifter sitter på världens största oljereserver. Det är svårt att tänka sig att ens Vidkunn Quisling gjorde mer skada för sitt fosterland.

Skapad 2011-07-28 00:38, senast ändrad 2011-07-29 10:10.

Although the report was released July 7, it is not until today that I have had a chance to read it, since I have been on a well-deserved vacation. So far I have read Chapter 6, “the events of June 28, 2009.” As regards the documental evidence there is nothing new, but the testimonies at the end are new – and interesting – to me, since they reveal just how incompetent the persons pushing for the Constitutional Assembly really are. Take Cesar Ham, who said “Miércoles antes de la cadena nacional y entonces Kike que no hallaba cómo explicar, que no, que mirá, me decía, que no sé qué, que esto, vamos a la consulta o vamos a la consulta le digo” (“Wednesday before the national address and Kike who didn’t find how to explain, that look, he said to me, that this, and that; are we having the poll or having the poll, I asked him”). There is nothing more revealing for who has something on his feet and who hasn’t, than their own declarations in this report. But the real dynamite comes in the omissions in the following chapter.

In Chapter 7 they enter into the territory of analysis of the legality of the events. Although I have only read part of the text, I have already discovered that they have made a serious error of judgment. By failing to take into account the international nature of the conflict, treating it as an internal Honduran affair, they have landed on the completely wrong foot. To exemplify, they consider it wrong by the Honduran Attorney General and Supreme Court to accuse Manuel Zelaya of treason, and that the Honduran Constitution defines treason in way too wide terms. However, nowhere in Chapter 6 did I see any reference to the well-established fact that Zelaya was a quisling for Hugo Chávez, and that Chávez – a president in a foreign nation – was bankrolling not just Zelaya’s efforts to hold the illegal referendum, but also the “civil society organizations” who were pushing Zelaya to go ahead against his own expressed doubts that it was politically possible.

There has been ample denouncements ever since before June 28 that Chávez was behind this, but in Chapter 6 this is only mentioned very casually, by referring to a joint TV appearance of Zelaya and Chávez. Nowhere is it mentioned that the Honduran society was very well aware of the unconstitutional, yes unconstitutional, Constituting Constitutional Assembly that Hugo Chávez had arranged in Venezuela shortly after being elected president in 1999, thus effectively carrying out a self-coup, an autogolpe; and that Chávez had proceeded to bankroll other president’s election campaigns in other Latin American countries, and their unconstitutional Constituting Constitutional Assemblies (e.g., Ecuador, Bolivia).

They knew in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula that the international community, lead by OAS and Insulza, would be most accommodating in welcoming such a coup d’état also in Honduras. They knew that Insulza effectively is a golpista apologist, and that OAS is a threat to democracy, especially after allowing Cuba back in without easing up one inch on their communist dictatorship.

They knew that nobody was going to save democracy if they didn’t do it. It was not a political battle in a country in peace. It was a state of Cold War, exactly the kind of cold war that Adolf Hitler referred to when he coined that term. The play by Hugo Chávez, himself a quisling of Fidel Castro, was as taken from the playbook of the Führer: Take over a foreign sovereign nation without using military force, simply by intimidation, bribes, and lies. But after having used the strategy successfully in a handful of Latin American countries, the Hondurans had taken note that many tracks led into the lion’s lair, but none led out.

Thus it is with sadness that I am forced to conclude that CVR, a commission that I myself promoted in the San José talks, have failed to cast the net large enough to capture the real truth about what happened in Honduras. They have steered clear of the most important issue: The threat that Trotskyist Communism poses to Latin America, and thus to the rest of the world through their methods. These methods include infiltration (taking power in democracies under false flag and then converting them to communist dictatorships), terrorism, and drug violence (spreading chaos and havoc in democracies to make them ripe to fall for their manchurian candidates).

Trotsky clearly promoted lies and crimes in order to take power in all major nations first, and then to introduce communism with all that it entails in the form of getting rid of private ownership. Hugo Chávez is a confessed follower of Trotsky, whose vision is the ultimate tyranny, with absolute world-wide concentration of power. The failure of making this connection by CVR is absolutely devastating for the usefulness of the report’s conclusion in a political context, although in its factual findings it is still relevant and valuable in a narrow context, and for that I congratulate the commission.

Published 2011-07-15 19:34, last edited 2011-07-16 07:52

It would be a full time job to maintain a blog record of all the violations of the Constitution, of Democracy, of Human Rights, and not at least of Decency, that Venezuelan Dictator Hugo Chávez is doing nowadays. Yet, if it does not get documented, there are naïve people who will refuse to believe that he is a dictator, just because he was elected in a democracy. Never mind that it is far from the first time a democratically elected leader has made himself dictator.

Venezuela is already far away from democracy. The damage to the economy is already vast. It seems apparent that the regime has been lying about oil reserves in order to borrow money, and that the country is basically broke, having sold the skin (i.e., the oil) before the bear was shot (i.e., having proven that the oil reserves actually exist). It is a plundering of catastrophic proportions that Cuba has carried out in the South American nation, with Hugo Chávez as Fidel’s quisling.

In 2007, Chávez himself said that he is a Trotskyist, a follower of the strategy of Leon Trotsky. He was the chairman of the soviet in Saint Petersburg during the (failed) Russian Revolution of 1905. When the White in Finland, the democrats, got their demands satisfied and the old Swedish-era democratic Constitution was reinstated in Finland, the Red took out their revenge and murdered all the “capitalists”, e.g. white collar workers, they could lay their hands on. That included my grandfather’s house, but he survived through a miracle, saved by their own workers who stopped the communists. Make no mistake, Trotskyists are no less bloodthirsty than Leninists or Stalinists, they just have a different strategy: First take absolute power in all major countries (so that there is nobody left with the necessary power to stop them), and only thereafter put their plans for total communism into action. One part of the Trotsky strategy calls for entering other parties in order to gain power through deceit – exactly what Lobo has done.

When Chávez said he is a Trotskyist, he thus said, “I plan to take absolute power on a continental scale, and when nobody is left to stop me I will eliminate all capitalists and introduce pure communism.”

Communism is not defeated. It just changed plan. It seems like they realized that “if you can’t beat them, join them.” By making the West believe that communism was defeated in 1989, the guard was let down. But also in 1989 the first steps were taken by Fidel Castro to take over Venezuela through a fifth colon rather than by guerilla war. It resulted in the Caracazo, and then the failed military coup by Chávez in 1992. In 1998 they managed to get Chávez elected, and in 1999 he illegally changed the Constitution. From there it has been downhill for Venezuela. China went into business with USA and now owns a significant part of USA’s foreign debt. Russia allegedly went democratic but is now back to its old authoritarian ways.

The biggest change is, however, in Latin America. Armed struggle has been replaced by a strategy of taking over through the use of civil society groups, which is not a bad thing in and of itself. In fact, it is the preferred method in a democracy. The problem is, however, that these groups are being used, or rather misused, for the benefit of an anti-democratic force that is acting under false flag: 21st Century Socialism. Hugo Chávez for years argued that it was democratic, but a new kind of democracy, not liberal democracy with strong and independent institutions but popular democracy, direct democracy. Using another word it can be called “mob rule” and that would be closer to reality. His plan is nothing new; it has been used since antiquity. Already the old Greeks saw many examples of when a strong-man took power from the city council through the support of the masses, those who did not understand the machinations of democracy, the balance of power. They had a name for such a strong-man. They called him “Tyrant.”

Chávez has bought significant amounts of modern war material from Russia and others. Russians have re-created their Caribbean fleet, and are building a military base in Venezuela. USA is allied with and has access to military bases in Colombia to the west of Venezuela, and to a base in the Dutch-administered Curacao just off Venezuela’s north coast. To the south Venezuela has a friendly nation, Brazil, but her neighbor to the east is Guyana, a nation with which Venezuela has a non-resolved border dispute. Venezuela claims that about 2/3 of Guyana really is Venezuelan territory and that the arbitration settlement in 1899 is invalid due to Britain not having acted in good faith, etc. All Venezuelan maps since 1970 show the disputed territory as belonging to Venezuela. Guyana is part of the British Commonwealth. There is a potential conflict that at present is being handled by the Secretary General of the UN. Hopefully it will not become the “Sudetland” of Venezuela.

The financing for Chávez’s plans comes of course from the coffers of the Republic of Venezuela. As a Trotskyist, he prioritizes taking power in other countries to consolidating the revolution in his own. Therefore he is allowing Venezuela to decay, and she is. Widespread electricity outages, lack of food production, and so on. The country is in dire straits, but Chávez pushes forward with supporting Cuba and buying influence in other Latin American countries. Apparently he must count on the final victory being so close so as to be within reach before Venezuela collapses completely. It means that he must count on final victory within a few short years, because that is how close Venezuela is to economical collapse.

What we cannot rule out, however, is that civil war starts in Venezuela sooner than that. If so, his stint is over. He cannot continue to expand his empire while fighting a civil war at home. One way in which a civil war could start is through a popular revolt, in which the military eventually has to pick side, and different parts of the country take different sides. This is just what happened in Libya this year, and similar to what happened in Spain after Franco’s half-failed coup, or in Finland after the November revolution in 1917. Venezuela sees more support for Chávez in some parts of the country, and more opposition in others. The risk for civil war is therefore significant as a result of any kind of revolt, civilian or military. There is a big powder-barrel and the fuse is very short now.

The bottom line is that there is a big and growing threat against peace and security in Latin America, but the threat is not confined to that continent. Chávez sees the enemy as being USA, but also her allies such as Israel and the UK. At the same time he is allied with other enemies of USA and Israel, such as Iran, Syria, Gaddafi’s Libya, Bielarus, etc., and also with drug lords and cocaine smugglers. But USA is ignoring him, not seeing him as a real threat. Is this wise?

After reading the executive summary I find the report to contain exactly what I had expected. First, that a lot of people kept their silence and didn’t reveal what they knew (the fact that CVR requested a meeting with me, whose only involvement has been writing this blog after the fact, amply illustrates that they have grasped at straws for getting to the truth). They have not been able to determine if the secret arrest warrant was issued the day it was dated, or afterwards in a CYA effort. This means that the report does not add any new facts, which is a pity. As for the legal analysis it is as could be expected, given that no new facts came out. Finally, since this is a legal and not a political study, they wisely refrain from evaluating what it means in political terms – something that I don’t have to refrain from here.

They identify three risks to modern democracy, not just in Honduras but generally, all exemplified from Honduras 2009. They are first that the executive office-holder abuses power and usurps powers from the other branches of government (it is clear that they see “modern democracy” as synonymous to “presidential republics”, because this is obviously something that cannot reasonably happen in a parliamentarian democracy). The second is that of an unconstitutional transfer of power, e.g. by military intervention. The third is the lack of clarity as regards the roles that the different institutional actors should assume in a crisis, due to poorly defined constitutions and laws. The report is structured along these three lines of analysis.

Zelaya made an “autogolpe”

In the executive summary they clearly state that president Mel Zelaya violated direct court orders before being deposed, and that the Supreme Court had a constitutional and legal method of deposing him. Having said this, they seem careful not to say that the president was obligated to obey the Supreme Court. In any constitutional democracy it is self-evident that the president is obligated to obey the Supreme Court, so by not stressing that point they are in fact implying that there is something wrong with the constitution of the Republic of Honduras – i.e., that it may give the president a position equivalent to an elected king with a one term limit. This is what I mean with them sticking to the legal and refraining from opinions on the political. Put in plain English: Anyone who is defending Zelaya’s actions and claiming that he should have been restored to power is implying that Honduras is not a constitutional democracy, since if it is a constitutional democracy, then Zelaya de facto made a coup d’état, an “autogolpe”. That is the political conclusion that the legal scholars refrain from expressing, but which can be read between the lines.

When it comes to the act of Congress to depose Zelaya, they stick to their task and discuss only the constitutionality or not thereof. Their conclusion is that Congress most likely did not have that authority, although the Constitution is vague and fails to clearly indicate which institution has what authority in this situation. Therefore it becomes necessary to make a political evaluation of intent, given the basic premise that Honduras is a constitutional democratic republic. At least in the executive resumé they do not consider the fact that Congress is the highest representative of the people between elections, given that Honduras is a representative democracy. In a constitutional crisis where the executive has violated the Constitution and failed to obey the Supreme Court, and there is a lack of clarity in the Constitution and laws of how to proceed, the one and only institution that can act independently is the Congress, since they “are” the people between elections, and all power emanates from the people.

Although the authors do not make this point, they imply it in the recommendation section. An important idea with the commission was to make recommendations of how to avoid a repetition of such a crisis, by strengthening the legal framework of the country. They recommend that the Supreme Court gets a clearer role as arbitrator between the different branches of government, and a stronger position visa-vi the executive. They further suggest that Congress should get an express role in the removal of the President.

It is interesting to note this, since the interim presidency all the time claimed that it already was that way. Here is a philosophical question: Does the relative power have to be set by laws, or can it be set by precedent? In the case of USA it was set by precedent, in 1803 (see “From strengthening institutions to a coup: Explaining the ouster of President Zelaya as an outcome of a game of institutional emergence“). All that it takes for this to become precedent is that it is accepted. To first say “no we don’t accept it because the law is not explicit” and then say “we should change the law so it explicitly becomes that way” is hypocritical. As long as the law is not explicitly forbidding it, it can be established by precedent, as was the case in Honduras 2009.

What will CVR say?

Their report is due any day. They ought to include the political analysis to the legal study. In this blog post I have indicated how I think their analysis should go. But the question is if they have the balls to challenge the entire global community, who called this a coup d’état. Do they dare? Can their careers survive it? That’s the question.

Some quotes

Reading the main text of the analysis, the report appears even more in line with the thinking of the supporters of the interim presidency. Could it be that the executive summary is adopted for political reasons to agree more with the official opinion of OAS and others? If so it is a shame. A truth commission should not look over its shoulder, but be the standard-bearer for independent analysis. In my humble opinion their conclusions are precisely what I have concluded since the very first posts on this blog. But now it is official.

About Zelaya

“Concluimos que la utilización del Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas para el propósito previsto en estos decretos fue ilegal bajo las leyes de Honduras.” (We conclude that the use of the National Institute of Statistics for the purpose of these decrees [holding a referendum] was illegal under the laws of Honduras.)
“Adicionalmente el Acuerdo 027-2009 violaba la normativa constitucional y legal relacionada a la utilización de la Fuerzas Armadas.” (Additionally the agreement 027-2009 violated the constitutional and legal norms for the use of the armed forces.)
“También concluimos que los Decretos Ejecutivos y el Acuerdo llamando a la “consulta” o “encuesta” probablemente no fueron conforme a derecho.” (We also conclude that the executive decrees and agreement calling for the referendum or poll probably were not in agreement with the law.)
“Estos artículos parecerían prohibir una Asamblea Nacional Constituyente bajo el orden constitucional actual.” (These [constitutional] articles would seem to forbid a national constitutional assembly under the present constitution.)
“Nosotros concluimos que el Presidente Zelaya Rosales ilegalmente incumplió con las órdenes judiciales del Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo.” (We conclude that president Zelaya Rosales illegally disobeyed the judicial orders from the contentious-administrative court.)

About Congress

“Al menos algunos de los cargos contra Zelaya Rosales parecen estar bien fundamentados.” (At least some of the accusations against Zelaya Rosales appear to be well founded.) [They exemplify with abuse of authority for disobeying a court order.]
“Nuestro análisis aquí concluye que el intento legislativo de destituir a Zelaya Rosales de su cargo probablemente violó la Constitución.” (Our analysis here concludes that the legislative intent to depose Zelaya Rosales probably violated the Constitution.)
“Por lo tanto el nombramiento [de Roberto Micheletti Bain] siguió lo establecido en la sucesión constitucional especificad en el artículo 242.” (Therefore the appointment [of Roberto Micheletti Bain] followed the constitutional succession order established in article 242.)

About the Armed Forces

“Por lo tanto, los comandantes de las Fuerzas Armadas observaron la ley cuando rehusaron a asistir con la Cuarta Urna.” (Therefore, the commanders of the armed forces were following the law when they refused to assist with holding the [referendum].)
“Las Fuerzas Armadas violaron el artículo 102 de la Constitución cuando expatriaron a Zelaya Rosales.” (The armed forces violated article 102 of the constitution when they expatriated Zelaya Rosales.)
“También dejamos nota que los oficiales militares fueron exonerados de su acusación penal en enero de 2010. No expresamos ninguna opinión con relación a este caso penal. Nuestro caso está limitado a la discusión de la legalidad de las acciones. La pregunta sobre si los oficiales militares son responsables criminalmente por la expatriación de Zelaya Rosales es distinta a la pregunta de si la expatriación fue legal.” (We also take note that the military officers were exonerated from their criminal accusations in January of 2010. We are not expressing any opinion in relation to this criminal case. Our task is limited to discussing the legality of the actions. The question of whether the military officers are criminally responsible for the expatriation of Zelaya Rosales is a different question from that of whether the expatriation was legal.)

My Comments

After reading the analysis of the constitutionality of the events, it appears to be the conclusion of the authors that president Zelaya Rosales was clearly acting outside the Constitution and the laws, as were the military when they expatriated him, but that the Congress was balancing near the margin of the Constitution (“probably violated”). Note again that this analysis is strictly based on the constitutional legality, and does not include neither a political analysis, nor a criminal analysis.

For a political analysis one has to evaluate the alternatives, and consider what they would likely have led to – in this case, and as a precedent. Failure to stop Manuel Zelaya Rosales would have led to the executive being above the law. He had amply demonstrated that he was not going to accept any order from anyone. There was no other tool at the disposal of Congress and the Courts than the use of force. The report finds that the Supreme Court had the legal right and due cause for having Zelaya arrested, and that the arrest order to the military was constitutional.

The point where the constitutional order was broken (after it was broken by Zelaya) was when the military expatriated him. It left the Congress and the Supreme Court with a very difficult situation to handle, in which both the president, and those charged with arresting the president, were acting unconstitutionally. It was a fundamentally political crisis, not legal, at that point. Consider the alternative to allow Zelaya back as president. He would surely not have agreed to return without having all his adversaries arrested first. The legal case against him would have been dead. The expatriation of him put the entire establishment before a fait accomplis: the military had figuratively burned the ships. From their perspective this was desirable, since they had openly defied him, refused to obey his orders. They knew that if he remained president their careers would be over. They had a personal interest in making sure that there was no chance for Zelaya to survive the crisis in office.

Personally I would not be surprised if they got tacit support from different individuals, within and even outside the country. It is no secret that Zelaya is allied with one of the greatest threats to peace in the Western Hemisphere: Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías. It is furthermore no secret that Chávez Frías has conspired to overthrow a number of democracies using the same unconstitutional method as Zelaya Rosales attempted in Honduras (starting with Venezuela in 1999). In none of the other cases has the democratic checks and balances managed to defend the constitutional order. Although one would have preferred that Honduras’s military officers had stuck to the legal route of actions, one must therefore have a certain sympathy for their reasoning that “attack is the best defense”. There is no guarantee that the law would have prevailed if they had followed it.

Whatever one thinks about the military’s actions they did not assume power, and the actions of Congress are defensible under the circumstances as a precedent for a case not contemplated under the Constitution. That is the bottom line that emerges from a political analysis of this legal report, and that makes it perfectly clear that the deposal of Zelaya Rosales was not a coup d’état. (While the authors of this report have not been able to determine if the secret arrest orders were issued the days they are dated, or created when they were made public in order to cover up a military coup, I am assuming that they were for real, for 3 reasons: First, because they had legal backing and it would be illogical to use extra-legal methods when one has legal methods at ones disposal. Second and third, because I have it from two different sources, who don’t know each other, that they knew about the secret arrest order already June 25 or 26; both are family members of people involved in the events. Of course they could be lying, but what sense would that make when they had the law on their side? Therefore I consider it far fetched to believe that it was a military coup that they were trying to cover up.)

Summing up

When the Truth and Reconciliation Commission report is published, the last chapter of the events of June 28, 2009, will be written. That marks the end of the political events, the final step in the implementation of the Guaymuras-dialogue agreement, the San José-Tegucigalpa Accord. It has been implemented meticulously by first interim president Micheletti, then president Lobo, even though ex-president Zelaya backed away from it when he realized that Congress would not vote him back as president.

What remains is to learn from this event. Honduras has already amended its constitution as regards popular referendum, but as this report points out in its recommendation section, also the new wording is insufficiently clear. The recommendations in this report should be taken very seriously by the Congress in Tegucigalpa, both those regarding crisis solution, regarding the removal of a high office-holder especially the president, those regarding changing the constitution, and those regarding popular referendum. All of those parts were involved in the crisis of 2009, and all of them are important to protect the democracy against the kind of attacks launched by Hugo Chávez and his Cuban allies; their goal is to take over all countries in Latin America, installing Quisling regimes that are beholden to “Socialism of the 21st Century” (i.e., communism).

The strategy of Castro and Chávez is to win democratic elections with the financial backing of the Venezuelan state (oil revenues), and then once in office call for a national constitutional assembly to rewrite the constitution, creating a structure that will enable their Quisling to stay in power indefinitely. Only when the power is secured will they complete the transformation to communism, as they appear to follow Trotsky’s strategy of spreading their power first before consolidating communism. (In fact, in 2007 Chávez himself confessed to being a Trotskyist!)

Honduras was the first major set-back in their plan. The attacks continue unabated, and the war is not yet won. Millions of dollars are still being spent to try to bribe their way in. It is a dangerous and volatile situation, and the more the world punished Honduras economically after the alleged “coup”, the more they pushed Honduras into Castro’s and Chávez’s fold. The wise thing to do now, when this legal report is out, is to acknowledge that Manuel Zelaya Rosales was in clear violation of the Constitution, that he had to be arrested and removed from office to preserve constitutional democracy, and that while a clear error of judgment was made in expatriating him it, it does not change the equation: Zelaya could not be left in office. We have to separate the two issues, the expatriation and the removal from office. We can condemn one while applauding the other. It was, frankly, stupid to expatriate Zelaya Rosales, but the action of Congress can be defended as attempting to find a way out of an impossible situation not contemplated by the Constitution, setting a precedent that can well be codified in a constitutional amendment now, following the recommendations of this report.

Published 13:37 June 9, last updated 07:59 June 10.

Hugo Chávez, the guy in Caracas who thinks the Devil is around because he can smell sulfur, not realizing that the stench surely comes from himself, is spending a huge amount of capital and efforts on undermining Honduras’ democracy. He has not given up by any stretch of the imagination. Furthermore, he is getting active assistance from the diplomats of the present U.S. administration. Whether that is due to stupidity or worse I cannot tell. What I can prognosticate, however, is that American security is heading straight towards Hell – and that includes North American as well as Latin American security.

It is fascinating to see how similar the development now is to that in Europe in the 1920′s and 1930′s. In both the economic and the political spheres. The Great Recession has now turned out to be a double-dip recession, just like the Great Depression was. It was not the first dip that made the late 1929 and early 30′s so horrible, it was the fact that when the recovery was supposed to set in a new, much worse recession hit, fueled I’m sure by bad economic policies, like those that the Republicans want to introduce in U.S.A. today. Austerity measures now will guarantee that this develops into “Great Depression 2.0″.

On the political front the similarity is equally scary. Now as then there is a profound polarization, and the middle is all but absent. There are no grown-ups in the room. The debate belongs to ideologues on both extremes, all of whom seem to believe more in the map than in the reality. Furthermore, just like the 1930′s saw a communist regime in Spain, which with its irresponsible ideological actions was destroying the economy of that country, so does the 2010′s see a communist regime in Venezuela, which with its irresponsible ideological actions is destroying the economy of South Americas arguably richest country (being a major oil producer). We know what happened in Spain; a half-failed military coup led to a cruel civil war in the lead-up to WWII; a battle between communists and fascists.

The Cold War ended around 1990 – or did it? The Bolsheviks are violent, they do not recognize ethical rules and moral restrictions. They consider that the goals justify the means, so in the first Russian Revolution of 1905 they went from house to house and murdered people with whose opinions they did not agree. My grandfather’s family was on their list, but he narrowly survived. In 1917 they succeeded in their revolutionary quest, and started eliminating opponents on a grand scale; first Lenin, then Stalin. Stalin’s strategy was to consolidate the revolution in the Soviet Union first, while Trotsky preferred to first spread it to the rest of the world. Trotsky had to flee the country, and ended up in Mexico where he was murdered by Stalin years later. Nevertheless, he was active in Latin America for a while before being eliminated.

It should come as no surprise, thus, that the Latin American communists apparently are following Trotsky’s strategy, not Stalin’s. Fidel Castro has for half a century worked underground to spread communism in Latin America. One of the earliest targets was Venezuela, for her wealth no doubt. At first they tried military intervention with guerillas. When that failed they tried to infiltrate the military and use that Trojan horse to incapacitate the security forces at the time of popular protests in 1989, against then president Carlos Andres Perez (CAP). They also deployed snipers, armed by Castro, to shoot at the military. The bloodbath became known as the “caracazo”, and Hugo Chávez never fails to blame the slaughter on CAP, even though he was in on the whole plan and knows that the architect was Fidel Castro.

When that also failed, the next attempt was to have Hugo Chávez carry out a military coup in 1992, against CAP. Also that failed, and Chávez went to jail. Unfortunately, he was let free after 2 years and allowed to run for president in 1998, an election that he won – presumably with the help of significant funding from Venezuela’s enemies, a modus operandi that Chávez himself has deployed repeatedly once in power, spending billions on propping up Manchurian candidates in countries like Honduras, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, and Argentina. This is the Trotsky plan in full swing: Spread communism to the whole world, by getting access to the resources of a rich state such as Venezuela, and using those resources to subvert democracy in other countries, using the democratic method to gain power, only to immediately dismantle democracy thereafter so that they cement their hold on power.

So is the Cold War over? Yes in the sense that Stalin’s strategy failed. But No in the sense that communism has not been defeated, because Trotsky’s strategy – which survived in Havana, Cuba – has not yet been defeated.

Honduras won a battle against Trotskyism

However, they only won a battle. The war is still going on, and no country has come to the assistance of Honduras. In fact, some of those that ought to have helped Honduras have instead assisted the aggressor, the Trotskyist Republic of Venezuela (Chávez’s name, the “Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”, is a misnomer since Bolivar was not a communist).

It is imperative to understand what the weapons are of the Trotskyist approach. Apart from using astronomical amounts of money (stolen from the Venezuelan people) to bribe politicians abroad, and to buy positive publicity, they simultaneously sow mayhem and chaos by actively working to help criminal activities in the target countries. This means facilitating for cocaine smugglers, by not interfering, by providing safe haven, and even by providing military weapons (such as the Swedish anti-tank weapon AT-4). Cuba and Venezuela are criminal enterprises, no less. They are mafia states. They should not be accepted in civilized company, or as we say in Sweden, “in rooms with furniture”.

The worst about this dire development is that there appears to be no awareness among groups that are able to do something about it. Within Honduras there is ample awareness, but the Trotskyists have managed to make the rest of the world isolate Honduras and close their ears to their arguments, thus rendering their warnings unable to reach those who need to hear it. Within Venezuela there is also awareness, but they, too, are being attacked and marginalized with the help of false imprisonment (case in point: Alejandro Peña Esclusa), scare tactics, violence, or propaganda campaigns. Sure, there are people that know what is going on, such as former Venezuelan Ambassador to the UN, Diego Arria, but for some reason media seem to dismiss them. Could it be money? Could it be threats? I don’t know, but we cannot allow ourselves to be scared.

When journalists are murdered their colleagues get the message. “If you write about what he or she wrote about, you die.” So they don’t write about it, they don’t even report what it was that he or she wrote about, because if they do they sign their own death sentence. Communists have long used this method. My own grandfather used to travel around Sweden and tell the truth of what he had witnessed during a visit to the Soviet Union, at the height of the killing of farmers in Ukraine. First they tried to poison him in Moscow, then they made at least 3 attempts on his life in Sweden. Eventually he had to keep silent for the sake of his wife and children. So, argumentum ad bacculum does work. That is how the communists win their arguments. Do you want to live in such a world? And do you really want to fight another war against communism? If you don’t, then don’t yield to those bastards. Stand up for freedom Now, before it is too late. Especially You, president Obama. Especially You. The world economy can’t afford a Republican president after the next election, but if you treat Chávez the way Chamberlain treated Hitler, we surely will have one.

Ante las estrellas de este cielo,
a las orillas del Gran Caroní,
con esta brisa en compañía,
con nuestro corazón en la mano y nosotros como únicos testigos,
juramos:
Por el Dios de nuestros padres,
por el Dios de nuestro pueblo,
por nuestras vidas,
por nuestra patria y nuestra bandera,
que ante este y cualquier otro gobierno que comande el destino de la Patria,
no seremos indiferentes ante las acciones que vayan en contra de la Libertad.
Juramos,
defender nuestros derechos y a la democracia porque es nuestro destino,
porque hemos nacido para esto,
porque creemos en la Igualdad,
porque es nuestro deber con el futuro.
Con nuestra acción y nuestro verbo escribiremos la historia de nuestro país.
Seremos entonces el recuerdo vivo del ejemplo a seguir para las generaciones que vienen detrás de nosotros,
en lucha, en valor, en fraternidad, en compromiso y coraje,
frente a quienes atenten contra los principios y valores de los padres fundadores de la República.

A la medianoche, del 29, del tercero, del 2011

LO JURAMOS!!

Juramento de los jovenes de Operación Libertad en Venezuela.

And of course Fidel Castro, being sharp, understands this, which is why he directed Chávez to use TeleSur to put everything on the line to make sure Libya does not become a success for a democratic revolt. They know they are next.

What it means is that the UN has declared color. Chávez cannot use deadly force to suppress peaceful protests, or there will be military consequences.

It is key to have a good social media communication system, though. Sites like Facebook and Twitter can determine the future of Latin America for decades.

One may wonder why he hasn’t realized the risks earlier. My guess is the coca he is chewing (according to his own admission). Scientists have discovered that it affects the risk evaluation center in the brain, making people less wary of the risks of their actions. This may be an important factor to consider when evaluating his behaviour.

En diciembre del 2010 en Venezuela hubo fuertes demostraciones anti-gobierno, tanto en provincia como en la capital. Hugo Chávez desplegó las fuerzas de seguridad en contra de ellos ridiculizándolos como irrelevantes y totalmente incapaces de detener su proyecto socialista. Ni siquiera el hecho de que la mayoría de los votantes rechazaron sus políticas lo disuadió. Sus aliados en la nueva Asamblea Nacional que tomo posesión el 5 de enero lo único que demostraron fue contención hacia los que no estaban de acuerdo con ellos, faltándole el respeto a los principios de conducta que son comunes a todos los parlamentos democráticos. El 23 de enero Chávez dijo en un mitin del partido oficialista en las afueras del palacio presidencial que nada detendría la revolución socialista, mientras que los medios de comunicación descartaron como insignificante a la gran concentración al otro lado de la ciudad.

Sin embargo, el 25 de enero, comenzó el levantamiento en Egipto. Túnez pudo ser visto como un evento solitario, pero ahora probaba ser contagioso. La gente también hablaba sobre Libia. Chávez seguramente le avisó a su amigo, como él lo llama, Moammar Gaddafi, sobre cómo él había detenido exitosamente un levantamiento similar tiempo atrás, el 11 de abril, 2002. En Venezuela, esto se conoce como Plan Ávila. Consiste en disparar proyectiles verdaderos a una demostración pacífica. Hugo Chávez tenía al menos 57 personas armadas posicionadas en una emboscada, y en la tarde mataron 19 personas e hirieron 150. Había francotiradores que podían acertar disparos a la cabeza desde techos de edificios, y personal con pistolas disparando sin blanco fijo desde un puente sobre la calle. La propaganda de Chávez luego atribuyó que la masacre había sido orquestada por la oposición para obligarlo a renunciar. No está claro si él renunció voluntariamente o fue forzado a hacerlo, pero luego fue ayudado y fue entonces cuando declaró que había sido un golpe de estado –pasando por alto su propia culpa en la masacre. Mientras se llevaba a cabo la masacre, Chavez estaba “en vivo” por todos los canales de TV después de haberles ordenado transmitir su alocución (la famosa cadena). Sin embargo, varios de los canales dividieron sus pantallas, con Chavez declarando que todo estaba en calma en la mitad de la pantalla, y con imágenes en vivo del baño de sangre fuera del palacio presidencial en la otra mitad.

Uno pudiese sospechar que Chávez le avisó a su amigo en Libia que el Plan Ávila funciona, siempre y cuando se asegure de que no hay medios de comunicación presentes. Tal cual hizo Gaddafi, mientras él y sus esbirros le disparaban a una multitud desarmada con granadas explosivas anti-aéreas. Usando cañones antiaéreos que, según una fuente del gobierno de Chávez que fue citado anónimamente en internet, les fueron entregadas a Libia por Venezuela en el presente mes (Marzo, 2011).

Sin embargo, así como Chávez falló en el 2002, también lo hizo Gaddafi en el 2011. Los medios de comunicación social se convirtieron en su talón de Aquiles. Las imágenes se regaron por todo el mundo y el levantamiento de Libia se intensificó.

Mientras, el éxito de las revoluciones pacíficas en Túnez y especialmente en Egipto le han dado nueva esperanza a los disidentes de Venezuela y Cuba. El régimen de Castro está tan preocupado que salieron en TV acusando a USA de instigar un levantamiento via medios de comunicación social, algo que por supuesto solo contribuyó a que la gente de la Isla este más pendiente de esto. En Venezuela, la Operación Libertad comenzó como una huelga de hambre liderizada por los estudiantes para exigir la liberación de los presos políticos. Al principio muchos dudaban que ellos tuviesen éxito, pero después de varias semanas se las arreglaron para obtener atención del gobierno y ahora han conseguido concesiones significativas y varios liberados de muy alto perfil.

Aunque la semana pasada hubo una reacción violenta de retroceso. Un juez había ordenado la liberación de Carlos Chancellor, pero fue detenido en la puerta con la orden de otro juez, y los activistas y medios que esperaban afuera fueron golpeados y arrestados. Esto llevó a llamadas de ayuda via Twitter y Facebook. En el lapso de una hora los activistas fueron liberados y dentro de las siguientes 12 horas el prisionero fue liberado, esta vez de verdad. Obviamente el régimen está hilando muy cuidadosamente. El cambio, comparado al tiempo previo a la revolución tunicina es asombroso.

¿Significa esto que Chávez se ha vuelto demócrata? No. Desde hace dos semanas ha habido una nueva ola de protestas callejeras, vías obstruidas y actividades anárquicas generalizadas por la que se hace llamar resistencia en Honduras (el FNRP). Hay una razón muy fuerte para creer que Chávez los financia y que estas acciones son cometidas bajo sus órdenes. ¿Que gana él con esto?

Pienso que él necesita algo para distraer. Lo que más quiere es provocar la reacción del gobierno de Porfirio Lobo a la que sus medios de comunicación pueden voltear como violencia de la derecha en contra del pueblo (el ministro de información de Chávez también es el director de TeleSur). El necesita algunas “noticias” que refuercen el prejuicio de que América Latina está llena de militares golpistas y dictadores en potencia a quienes no les importa el pueblo. Si él se las puede arreglar para hacer rodar esa historia, podría entonces justificar la toma de medidas enérgicas en casa culpando a los disidentes de ser aliados de los “golpistas” en Honduras. Esta es la estrategia de su juego.

Fallaría, por supuesto, porque Chávez ha perdido su credibilidad. Lo mismo que TeleSur, después de darle soporte a Gaddafi. Además, Honduras entiende el mapa del juego. Ellos entienden que el enemigo real no es FNRP ni el sindicato de maestros, sino Hugo Chávez y Fidel Castro. Ellos saben que la mejor defensa es el ataque, y el mejor ataque es que salga LA VERDAD y colocarla en Internet y las redes sociales. Ellos están conscientes de los vastos recursos que Castro y Chávez gastan en personal pagado para editar sitios donde la gente colabora con los escritos, como Wikipedia, para promover su versión de la historia (ej., llamando a la masacre del 2002 “golpe de estado”). Todos los demócratas de América Latina están despertando gradualmente a la realidad que la amenaza Trotskyiana de Cuba debe ser enfrentada trabajando e interactuando en las redes de comunicación social, y colaborando mas allá de nuestras fronteras, tal cual lo hacen los comunistas. Está sucediendo mientras usted lee esto.

In December of 2010 there were strong anti-government demonstrations in Venezuela, both on the country-side and in the capital. Hugo Chávez deployed the security forces against them and ridiculed them as being irrelevant and totally unable to stop his socialist project. Not even the fact that a majority of the voters had rejected his policy deterred him. His allies in the new congress that took office on January 5th showed nothing but open contempt at those disagreeing with them, and disregarded the principles of conduct that are commonplace in democratic parliaments. On January 23rd Chávez said in a party rally outside the presidential palace that nothing would stop the socialist revolution, while the media dismissed as insignificant the large opposition rally in the other end of town.

However, on January 25th the uprising in Egypt started. Tunisia could be seen as an isolated event, but now it proved to be contagious. People talked about Libya, too. Chávez surely advised his friend, as he calls him, Moammar Gaddafi, how he had successfully stopped a similar uprising back on April 11, 2002. In Venezuela it is known as Plan Avila. It consists of shooting with live ammo into the peaceful demonstration. Hugo Chávez had at least 57 armed persons positioned in an ambush, and in the afternoon they killed 19 persons and injured some 150. There were both snipers who could deliver head shots from roof tops, and staffers with pistols shooting without aiming from a bridge over the street. Chávez’s propaganda later claimed that this massacre had been orchestrated by the opposition in order to make him resign. It is not clear whether he actually resigned voluntarily or was forced to, but later he was helped to return and then he declared that it had been a coup d’état – while ignoring his own culpability in the massacre. While the massacre took place Chávez was on live TV on all channels, after having ordered them to broadcast his speech (a so-called cadena). However, several of the channels went into a split-screen, with Chávez declaring that all is calm on half the screen, and live images of the bloodbath outside the presidential palace on the other half.

One may suspect that Chávez advised his friend in Libya that Plan Avila works, just as long as he makes sure there is no media present. Which is just what Gaddafi did, as he had his henchmen fire into the unarmed crowd with exploding anti-aircraft grenades. Using guns that, according to a source in Chávez’s government that was quoted anonymously online, were delivered from Venezuela to Libya in the present month (March of 2011).

However, just like Chávez failed in 2002, so did Gaddafi fail in 2011. Social media became his Achilles heel. The images spread over the world and the uprising in Libya intensified.

Meanwhile, the success of the peaceful revolutions in Tunisia and especially Egypt had given new hope to the dissidents in both Venezuela and Cuba. The Castro regime is so concerned that they went out on TV and accused the U.S. of instigating a popular uprising via social media, something that of course just contributed to making more people on the island aware of it. In Venezuela, the Operacion Libertad started as a student-led hunger-strike to demand the release of political prisoners. At first many doubted that they could succeed, but after several weeks they managed to get attention from the government and have now managed to get significant concessions and several high-profile releases.

Last week there was a backlash, though. A judge had ordered the release of Carlos Chancellor, but at the door he was stopped on the order of another judge, and the activists and media waiting outside were beaten and arrested. This let to calls for help via Twitter and Facebook. Within an hour the activists were released again, and within 12 hours the prisoner was released, for real. Obviously the regime is threading very carefully. The change compared to pre-Tunisian revolution is staggering.

Does this mean that Chávez has become democratic? No. Since 2 weeks back there has been a new wave of street protests, road blocks, and general anarchist activities by the so-called resistance in Honduras. There is strong reason to believe that Chávez finances them, and that this action was commenced on his orders. What does he gain by this?

My take is that he needs a distraction. What he wants most of all is to provoke some reaction from the government of Porfirio Lobo that his media can spin into it being right-wing violence against the people (his minister of information is the head of TeleSur). He needs some “news” that enforces the prejudice that Latin America is full of military golpistas and wannabe dictators who don’t care about the people. If he can manage to get such a story running, then he can justify a crackdown at home by blaming the dissidents of being allied with the “golpistas” in Honduras. That is his game plan.

It will of course fail because Chávez has lost his credibility. And so has TeleSur, after backing Gaddafi. Plus Honduras understands the lay of the land. They understand that the real enemy is not FNRP of the teacher’s union, but Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro. They know that attack is the best defense, and the best attack is to get the TRUTH out on the internet and in social media. They are aware of the vast resources that Castro and Chávez spend in having paid staff editing collaborative sites such as Wikipedia, to promote their version of history (i.e., calling the 2002 massacre a “coup d’état”). All of democratic Latin America is gradually waking up to the reality that the Trotskyist threat from Cuba has to be fought by networking in social media, and collaborating across borders just like the communists do. It is happening as you read this.

Created 14:17, last updated 16:52.

The resolution specifically called for Libya to stop supporting terrorism, which Gaddafi refused until 2001. Returning to Venezuela, Chávez was sworn in as democratically elected president in 1999.

Both Libya and Venezuela are oil-producing nations which, under Gaddafi and Chávez respectively, have been very generous in donating money to groups and governments that are solidly anti-USA. This has been more important for them than the well-being of their own people. Sure, Chávez has thrown some crumbles to the poor, to keep up a base of support, which has not been very expensive to buy considering the poverty that existed (and let this be a warning to other democracies: Having a big social gap is a security threat!). But the big money has gone abroad, and into Chávez’s own pockets.

It is not far-fetched to suspect that Gaddafi was helping the terrorist revolutionaries in Venezuela. Nor is it far-fetched to suspect that he in some way encouraged Chávez’s military coup d’état attempt in 1992. If he did, then of course Hugo Chávez would be reluctant to turn against him in this situation. It would, in my opinion, explain his words, and the way he has used his propaganda-TV-channel TeleSur, which has traveled around in Libya in Venezuelan diplomatic cars during this conflict, spreading pro-Gaddafi propaganda in Latin America.

As Libya has been in full uprising, media have not been allowed in. Except for TeleSur from Venezuela, that is. The satellite-TV 24/7 “news” channel sent a reporter who reported from Tripoli that “all is calm”. His version of events has precisely so much to to with reality as the infamous press conferences by Saddam’s minister of information.

While a pro-Chávez site like Narco News tries to explain this away, as having nothing to do with the political leadership, and nothing to do with the poor “journalists” in TeleSur, it defies credibility that all is the fault of some anonymous “middle management”. Even more incredulous is the suggestion that the reason the management has not been able to correct this error in reporting is that the head of TeleSur doesn’t have enough time for the network, since he is also the minister of information(!).

Hang on, doesn’t that raise any red flag to Narco News? This is a major story: Hugo Chávez’s information minister is the head of the multi-national TV “news” network that is forming the way western media reports about most events in Latin America. If that is not a Ministry of Propaganda, I don’t know what is. Let me just take one example. When the president of Honduras, Manuel Zelaya, was arrested by the military on an order from the Supreme Court, a decision backed up by all institutions of the state, it was none other than TeleSur who chose to label it a “military coup”.

It was also TeleSur who sent the vast majority of reports from the unfolding events in Honduras after June 28th. As I have blogged about extensively, they staged events, they chased away other journalists to avoid having witnesses to the fake media stories, and they cooperated with Hugo Chávez and Manuel Zelaya in doing this. For the European and North American media to have swallowed their story-line was a major propaganda victory for them. An even bigger victory it was that they managed to make a large part of the Honduran population believe in their spin (even among the majority who agree that it was correct to depose Zelaya there are many who believe it was a military coup).

It was, again, TeleSur who pumped out the false story that the protests against Correa in Ecuador was an attempted coup d’état, as exposed – again – by Narco News, still a Chávez-supporting site mind you. In this case they blamed the spin on Eva Golinger, an American lawyer who has become deeply involved in the propaganda apparatus of the Chávez regime.

TeleSur has thus been a huge success for Chávez as a propaganda tool. With the help of it, he has managed to control the news not just in Latin America, but in the case of Honduras in the whole world. In every single country in the entire world – including a substantial part of Honduras itself! That would be amazing for a news outlet, but even more so for what now has been nakedly de-masked as a pure propaganda outlet for the regime.

However, their reporting from Tripoli has been received rolling on the floor laughing, even in Caracas. The entire credibility of TeleSur is down the drain, and I doubt very much that any, and I say any, even their ally al Jazeera, would touch their stories again.

So why did Chávez, and his “information” minister Izarra, sacrifice this priceless asset? He is basically throwing in the towel on trying to export his “21st Century Socialism” to other countries, because without an overwhelming propaganda campaign, it just can’t be done. So what was so valuable?

There are some options to consider. Maybe he was concerned that the oil prize would skyrocket if Gaddafi fell. It would hurt Venezuela, because Chávez has sold oil contracts beyond what he can deliver, for a price that is below today’s market price, so he has to purchase the difference on the spot market. Thus, the higher the oil price, the more Venezuela loses.

Or maybe he is afraid of the Arab virus jumping the Atlantic. There is a growing resistance against him in Venezuela (#OperacionLibertad; another one just showed up on the Internet with the aim of deposing Castro on Cuba). The TeleSur spin could be aimed at discrediting his home-grown opposition, which has whole-heartedly supported the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and of course Libya.

But there is also that third explanation, the most scary one: That it actually was Gaddafi who secretly backed Chávez so he could come to power in an election, when his coup d’état in 1992 failed. It is no secret that Chávez and Gaddafi are pals. It is no secret that their respective foreign departments have remained in close contact through this crisis (it has openly been declared in Caracas). And now this blatant lying from TeleSur, under the direct control of Chávez’s own minister of propaganda, I mean “information”. What is it they say about the one that talks like a chicken, walks like a chicken, looks like a chicken?

The alternatives for Egypt are (1) continued dictatorship under Mubarak, (2) a new dictatorship probably of the Islam extremist kind, and (3) democracy. It seems the military are in favor of alternative 3. However, they realize that if the dice are thrown up in the air now, they may well land on alternative 2 instead. Every statesman in the world realizes that. Does ElBaradei know something outsiders don’t, or did he commit a big political blunder?

Because of ElBaradei, at least to a significant extent, people stayed on the streets. Today the thug crackdown on the demonstrators started. It is the same method used by Chávez to great effect; send in civilian-dressed security personnel to use violence against the demonstrators anonymously. We must assume that they are police in civilian clothes. When Chávez did that in April 2002 he forgot to tell all the uniformed personnel, so some of them ended up shooting and killing some of the thugs, for which they are now serving 30 years in jail (they are thus the first political prisoners of Venezuela of the present dictatorship).

The military in Egypt surely know this. If they defend the civilians and leave Mubarak in power, they go to jail. They would thus have to depose Mubarak in order to defend the civilians. But if they do that, they also know, from Honduras 2009, that they will be called “golpistas” and not recognized by the global community. It was a dragon-seed for the UNGA to label the deposing of Zelaya a coup d’État, as I wrote in February 2010 and again in May 2010.

The US and the EU should immediately lift the phone, call the military in Egypt and tell them, “we promise to recognize the interim government, as long as it is civilian and free elections are held before the end of the year, even if Mubarak is removed by the military, provided that you stop the bloodbath in Cairo.” The precedent from Honduras has to be undone before it causes more damage.

Hungerstrejken utanför Organisationen för Amerikanska Stater i Caracas, Venezuela, syftar till att få OAS att ta tag i frågan om övergrepp mot mänskliga rättigheter i landet.

Tidpunkten verkar vald för att kasta smolk i glädjebägaren för Hugo Chávez, då den 2 februari var planerat som en dag att fira 12-årsdagen av då han svors in som demokratiskt vald president. Hans bristande respekt för grundläggande mänskliga rättigheter för hans politiska fiender, och hans åsidosättande av rättsväsende, riksdag, landsting, kommuner och grundlag, har dock fått honom att bli formellt definierad som diktator av uppåt ett hundratal organisationer både inom och utom landet. Valet av OAS (Organisationen för Amerikanska Stater) beror på att de har ett mandat att försvara demokrati i medlemsländerna, vilket de helt verkar strunta i då det gäller införande av diktatur “åt vänster”.

De politiska fångarna i Venezuela. Från www.liberenlosya.com

Enligt en analys av USAs ambassad i Caracas (i ett wikileaks-läckt telegram) är Chávez mera intresserad av att hålla sig kvar vid makten, än av det socialistiska projekt han talar sig så varm för, “bolivariansk socialism”. Simón Bolívar var den ledare för den Sydamerikanska befrielserörelsen som till slut lyckades göra kontinenten fri från Spanien.

Trots att Chávez predikar socialism, och i snabb takt nationaliserar företag (över 700 hittills) och jordbruk (2,5 miljoner ha enligt The Guardian), så bryter han i aktiv handling mot sin egen ideologi då han säljer ut det av hans föregångare Carlos Andrés Pérez på 70-talet förstatligade oljebolaget PDVSA för att få in kapital. Den senaste affären som blivit känd var en försäljning av aktier för 1,6 miljarder dollar till Ryssland, i samband med en affär i vilken ett ryskt bananföretag ingick ett samarbete med ett venezolanskt statligt företag om att driva 20 tusen ha bananplantager i Venezuela.

I december försökte Chávez konfiskera 47 gårdar söder om Maracaibosjön, men några av dem lyckades hålla militären och myndigheterna stången. Motiveringen som anfördes för konfiskationen var att ge oanvänd mark för bostäder till de som blivit hemlösa i höstens översvämningar i området. Eftersom marken är översvämningsbenägen är den dock olämplig till ändamålet, och dessutom är den inte oanvänd; närapå hälften av landets mjölkproduktion kommer från de gårdarna. Den verkliga anledningen föreföll komma fram då kopplingen till banankontraktet blev känt. Det kan dock finnas ytterligare lager av lögner i historien.

Området ifråga har outnyttjade oljereserver, och just Ryssland har levererat avancerade stridsflygplan och tunga stridsvagnar till Chávez på kredit. Gårdarna ligger bara 10 mil från Colombia, där finns ett flygfält av 2,6 km längd, och det är stridsvagnsterräng. Sedan i julas har regionen gradvis militariserats, och förklarats vara ett nytt militärområde. Där finns nu 1,600 soldater som patrullerar vägarna på landsbygden, och det är ständiga identitetskontroller i huvudorten, Santa Barbara.

Några av de hungerstrejkande ungdomarna som kräver att alla politiska fångar i Venezuela omedelbart släpps fria.

Fotnot: Det var just mot Carlos Andrés Pérez (CAP) som Chávez gjorde den misslyckade militärkuppen 1992, och Chávez betraktade CAP som hans kanske värsta fiende, tills denne dog på juldagen. Frågan om CAP skall begravas i Miami eller i Venezuela är nu föremål för ett domstolsavgörande i Miami; CAP själv lär ha sagt att han inte ville bli begraven i Venezuela så länge Chávez styr landet, utan först “då demokratin återetablerats”. En annan observation som kan göras är att Chávez inte är den första att predika socialism samtidigt som han privatiserar; Adolf Hitler gjorde också det.

Santa Barbara is located SW of Lake Maracaibo, about 90 km from the border to Colombia. It has a 2600 m airfield.

(The times are 30 minutes before Venezuelan time, 1 hour before ET.)

Photos of military operations in the area 2011-01-27 http://plixi.com/p/72828075 http://plixi.com/p/72822750

Update: Some breaking news regarding the fire in the INTI offices in Santa Barbara. The confiscations tomorrow include property belonging to a man who was arrested accused of having set this fire, so this news is very relevant. At the night of the fire some farmers, chavistas, were drinking in the INTI office with the head of the office. The farmers were expecting to get part of the land that had been confiscated, that’s what Chavez had promised. But that evening they found out that the land would go to a banana deal with a Russian company, and so they got mad. They went out to block a road, but there was no traffic at that time of night so they returned, observed by quite a few persons. That’s when they put fire to the office. When the firemen arrived the head of the office held them back, dressed in only underwear, pistol in hand. When he finally allowed them to extinguish the fire, when all the documents had burned (except his address book), they found a woman locked up in the bathroom. Since then about a dozen persons have been arrested, who all have one thing in common: They are in opposition to Chavez. Wait, they have two things in common. Neither one was there that night.

Footnote about the oil reserves. Swedish “moderate” (i.e. right-wing) newspaper SvD writes that “Venezuela has the world’s largest oil reserve” but news that seeps out, pardon the pun, from Venezuela and Argentina suggests that there may be nothing more than politics behind those figures (“Do you remember the ‘mega-reservoir’ of oil that Enarsa found in Venezuela?”).

The list of signatories is headed by the Second Vice President (Speaker) of the Senate, Carmen Eva Gonzalez Lafuente, and the Head of the National Convergence Caucus, German Antelo Vaca. Also signed Senators Centa Reck, Jeanine Añez Chavez, Maria Elena Mendez de Leon, Mollina Roger Pinto, Carlos Sonnenschein Antelo, Marcelo Antezana and Bernard O. Sanz Gutierrez, who in the coming days will assume his post as head of the opposition bloc.

(Text from press release used with permission.)

From the gathering in Caracas. The crowd continued around the corner of the boulevard in the top left corner. I estimate over 100,000 people. The state TV channel reported 646 persons.

Map of Caracas

To help with orientation this map was created in Google Maps. Miraflores is the presidential palace. The main gathering is at 10:00 at Chacaíto metro station and east of it. At 12:00 there will be speeches at Plaza Venezuela, just west of the metro station by that name. At 08:30 organizers in Caracas will meet the caravan that has traveled for a week from western Venezuela, at the La Bandera metro station, and from there move to Plaza Venezuela.

Updated map over Caracas with relevant information. Miraflores is the presidential palace. Chavistas are meeting at Plaza O'Leary and marching to Miraflores. The opposition is meeting at Centro Comercial Lido. The metropolitan police is positioned between the two. SEBIN is the political police, where many political prisoners are held. The airport is in the east. Click to see in full scale.

Blog page created 2011-01-21 12:15, last updated 2011-01-23 19:37 ET.

Click on image to open in full resolution (1530x1980)

Haga clic para abrirlo en alta resolución (1530x1980)

The following flyer outlines the nature of the dictatorship in Venezuela.

Haga clic para abrirlo en alta resolución

List of confirmed venues
Times in 24 hour format, local time zone.

VENEZUELA
CARACAS
LUGAR: Avenida Fransisco de Miranda, Chacaíto
HORA: 10:00

Supporting rallies around the world, by continent and country:

NORTH AMERICA

USA

BOSTON
PLACE: Copley Square, entre las calles Boylston y Dartmouth, Boston
TIME: 11:00

CHARLOTTE
PLACE: 600 S Tryon St, Charlotte, NC (in front of Charlotte Observer)
TIME: 14:00

DALLAS
PLACE: La Carreta Argentina 214-944-5300. 1115 N. Beckley Ave, Dallas, TX
TIME: 14:00

HOUSTON
PLACE: In front of La Informacion newspaper, at 6065 Hillcroft St, Houston, TX 77081
TIME: 10:00

LOS ANGELES
PLACE: Federal Building at 1100 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90024
TIME: 13:00

MIAMI
PLACE: El Arepazo 2 3900 NW 79th Ave. Doral, FL
TIME: 12:30

NEW YORK
PLACE: 6th Avenue and 59th Street, NY, NY, monument of Simon Bolivar and José Martí (south of Central Park; authorized by NYPD)
TIME: 12:00

SAN FRANCISCO
PLACE: Union Square, downtown San Francisco, CA
TIME: 12:00

WASHINGTON DC
PLACE: Triangle Park (Simon Bolivar Statue Park), Intersection between Virginia Avenue N.W. and 18th st N.W.
TIME: 14:00

CANADA

EDMONTON
PLACE: Corner of White Ave (82nd) and Gateway Blvd (103rd)
TIME: 13:00

TORONTO
PLACE: Speakers Corner (between Nathan Phillips Square and Osgood Hall, Downtown)
TIME: 13:00

LATIN AMERICA

ARGENTINA

BUENOS AIRES
LUGAR: Monumento de los Españoles
HORA: 13:30

BRAZIL

SAN PAULO
LUGAR: Monumento As Bandeiras, Sao Paulo (al frente del Parque Ibirapuera) Praça Armando Salles de Oliveira S/N, São Paulo
HORA: 12:00

CHILE

SANTIAGO
LUGAR: Av. Dag Hammarskjold 3177, Vitacura, Santiago
HORA: TBA

COLOMBIA

BOGOTA
LUGAR: Parque nacional, calle 39 con carrera 7ma, costado occidental, Bogotá
HORA: 11:30

ECUADOR

GUAYAQUIL
LUGAR: Av 9 de octubre y Pedro Carbo, Plaza de San Francisco, Guayaquil
HORA: 16:30

HONDURAS

TEGUCIGALPA
LUGAR: Paseo Los Próceres, Tegucigalpa
HORA: 15:00

MEXICO

MEXICO DF
LUGAR: Obelisco a Bolivar en frente al Hard Rock Cafe
HORA: 12:00

NICARAGUA

MANAGUA
LUGAR: Permiso negado “por seguridad”*
HORA: -

PANAMA

PANAMA
LUGAR: Cinta Costera en las escalinatas frente a la estatua de Balboa, Panama
HORA: 10:00

PUERTO RICO

SAN JUAN
LUGAR: Parque Munhoz rivera, frente a la estatua de “El Libertador”
HORA: 10:30

PERU

LIMA
LUGAR: Plaza San Martin
HORA: 16:00

EUROPE

AUSTRIA

VIENNA
PLACE: Die Pestsäule Am Graben, 1010 Wien
TIME: 14:30

FRANCE

PARIS
PLACE: Trocadéro
TIME: TBA

GERMANY

FRANKFURT
PLACE: In front of “Alte Oper” (Teatro de la Opera), Am Opern Platz, 60313 Frankfurt am Main
TIME: 12:00

ITALY

BOLOGNA
PLACE: Piazza Maggiore
TIME: 15:00

MILANO
PLACE: Piazza del Duomo de Milan
TIME: 14:00

TURIN
PLACE: Delante del Tempio valdese (Torino (TO), Corso Vittorio Emanuele II, 23
TIME: 11:45

NETHERLANDS

AMSTERDAM
PLACE: Plaza del Dam, Amsterdam
TIME: 13:00

SPAIN

BARCELONA
LUGAR: Plaza de la Catedral, 08002 Barcelona
HORA: 12:00

MADRID
LUGAR: Paseo Venezuela del Parque El Retiro de Madrid
HORA: 12:00

AUSTRALIA

PERTH
PLACE: Corner of Williams St and Hays St, Perth
TIME: 12:00

First published 2011-01-16 18:03, last updated 2011-01-21 20:30 ET.

*One can only speculate that Daniel Ortega fears that his regime would be in risk of being overthrown if he would allow this demonstration. What else could the alleged “security risk” be?

A student of history may find that most of these tenets are not new by any means. They have been used in the past over and over by other dictators, e.g., Adolf Hitler. The repression has continued after this cable was written, by making judge Maria Afiuni and former presidential candidate Alejandro Peña Esclusa the latest political prisoners. How much longer, Venezuela?

VZCZCXRO0130
PP RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG
RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHCV #0750/01 1671323
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161323Z JUN 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3212
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 000750

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM VE
SUBJECT: TEN TENETS OF CHAVISMO

Classified By: CHARGE d'AFFAIRES JOHN P. CAULFIELD, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND
(D)

1. This message is the end of tour analysis of the political
situation in Venezuela by Embassy Deputy Political Counselor
Dan Lawton.

2. (C) Summary. Despite President Chavez's professed
allegiance to socialism, his political project lacks any
consistent ideology. Instead, the Venezuelan president
exercises an increasingly authoritarian playbook that ensures
his unquestioned, indefinite leadership and concentrates more
and more power in his hands. The Government of the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (GBRV) aggressively defends
its democratic legitimacy at the same time that it targets
key opposition leaders, polarizes society along political and
class lines, and hypes the existence of external and internal
enemies to justify repressive measures. Chavez's preference
for loyalty over competence, creation of parallel Bolivarian
institutions, efforts to forge a one-party state, and
chest-thumping nationalism also smack of creeping
totalitarianism. Overall, Chavismo poses a serious threat to
democracy not just in Venezuela but throughout the region,
and it directly competes against U.S. influence in Latin
America. Moreover, it is becoming ever more difficult to
begin any dialogue with a GBRV increasingly consumed by its
own solipsistic "revolutionary" fervor and outsized ambition.
End Summary.

--------------------------------------------- ------
One - There Is Only One Great, Indispensable Leader
--------------------------------------------- ------

3. (C) President Chavez has carefully cultivated his own
personality cult, such that for most Venezuelan voters,
President Chavez embodies Chavismo. Outsized billboards and
posters of Chavez dominate public buildings as well as the
rallies and campaigns of his United Socialist Party of
Venezuela (PSUV). Venezuelans can buy a wide range of Chavez
paraphernalia from Chavez action figures to Chavez watches to
a compact disc of Chavez singing Venezuelan folk songs. He
dominates all state media, which also broadcast his Sunday
"Alo, Presidente" talk show. Chavez regularly requires all
local television and radio networks to carry his speeches
("cadenas"); he has wracked up over 1200 such hours (50 days)
on the air. He has not groomed any successor and he
frequently rebukes even his most trusted advisors publicly.

4. (C) In pursuing the elimination of presidential term
limits, Chavez declared publicly numerous times that he is
indispensable to his Bolivarian Revolution. While voters
rejected his constitutional reform package in December 2007,
he succeeded in winning public approval of the elimination of
term limits for all elected offices in the February 2009
referendum. Chavez has repeatedly stated that he plans to
govern at least until 2020. A corollary to the Venezuelan
president's protagonism is that there can be no Chavismo
without Chavez. No Chavez supporter who has broken with
Chavez has prospered politically. The formerly pro-Chavez
Podemos party is all but broken after opposing Chavez's 2007
constitutional reform package. Former Defense Minister Raul
Baduel also spoke against indefinite reelection; he is
currently sitting in a Caracas military prison awaiting trial
on corruption charges.

----------------------
Two - Centralize Power
----------------------

5. (C) Chavez's "Socialism of the 21st Century" exalts the
government's active role in the economy and vilifies
capitalism, but in the minds of most Venezuelans, it remains
a vague notion of a state bearing benefits. The thread that
most consistently ties together Chavez's political project is
the increasing concentration of power in his hands. Chavez
has firm control over all the other branches of government.
The opposition foolishly boycotted National Assembly
elections in 2005, and currently only approximately 15 former
government supporters do not automatically support Chavez in
the 167-seat unicameral legislature. With few exceptions,
the judiciary rules in favor of the executive branch, even in
civil cases bereft of political implications.

6. (C) Chavez is also squeezing state and local governments
from above and below. He recently promulgated a law that
allows the central government to take state control over
ports, airports, and highways. The central government has
done just that in states run by opposition governors.

Moreover, Chavez created an appointed position to take over
virtually all the functions and budget of the opposition
mayor of Caracas. The National Assembly is considering
creating presidentially appointed regional vice presidencies
that would undermine elected governors. The Venezuelan
president also created community councils nationwide which
are registered by and report directly to the Office of the
Presidency. Chavez diverted 30 percent of state and local
discretionary development funds to these community councils.

--------------------------------------------
Three - Hype External and Internal "Enemies"
--------------------------------------------

7. (C) Chavez insists on depicting the United States (which
he habitually refers to as "The Empire") as Venezuela's
enemy. Although most Venezuelans are not anti-American,
Chavez's radical foreign policy plays to his base of firm
supporters and serves as a convenient rallying cry during
Venezuela's frequent elections. Although he holds virtually
absolute power in Venezuela, Chavez tries to reframe public
perceptions by depicting himself as David fighting Goliath,
usually the United States, but also occasionally Spain,
Colombia, or Israel. Chavez and other senior GBRV leaders
have tempered this script somewhat since the election of
President Obama. They tend to praise the President and
Secretary personally, while quickly adding that "imperial"
political power continues to be exercised in the United
States by big business, the military establishment, and the
CIA.

8. (C) Although domestic opposition to Chavez is weak and
disunited, Chavez and senior GBRV officials regularly accuse
it of plotting to overthrow or assassinate the Venezuelan
president in coordination with the United States. The GBRV
does not produce proof or in most cases actually pursue
charges; such allegations conveniently serve to circle the
wagons within Chavismo, to prevent across-the-aisle political
dialogue, and to discredit the opposition. The GBRV
regularly reminds voters that large sectors of the opposition
participated in the short-lived 2002 coup to give greater
credence to current "threats." Chavez also accuses the
opposition of doing the USG's bidding, calling them
"pitiyanquis." Moreover, government supporters regularly
accuse opposition-oriented press outlets of "media
terrorism," essentially building the case for continued
government harassment of the vestiges of independent media.

---------------
Four - Polarize
---------------

9. (C) Railing against the "oligarchs," Chavez exploits class
divisions in stratified Venezuela for political gain. By
playing almost exclusively to the over 70% of Venezuelans who
are poor, Chavez has maintained a reliable electoral majority
(with the exception of the 2007 constitutional referendum
vote when many Chavistas abstained). He is not only
channeling government resources to the economically
disadvantaged, but also prioritizing the GBRV's role in the
economy at the expense of the private sector. Such policies
squeeze the middle class and are feeding a growing brain
drain of professionals, sectors of society traditionally
associated with the opposition. They also increase citizens'
economic dependence on the GBRV.

10. (C) Politically, Chavez tolerates no middle ground.
Although increasingly large numbers of voters consider
themselves politically neutral, most Venezuelans still
habitually self-identify themselves as either with "the
process" or against. Moreover, the GBRV has a good idea
where most voters stand. Those that signed the 2004 recall
referendum soon found themselves on the infamous "Tascon
List" by which the GBRV discriminated in terms of government
jobs, contracts, and other benefits. In his speeches, Chavez
frequently cites mentor Fidel Castro, bellowing in stark
terms, "With the revolution, everything; outside, nothing."
After its most recent registration drive, the PSUV claims
over seven million members. Local analysts believe the PSUV
party list is becoming the "reverse Tascon List" -- if your
name is not on it, you cannot expect to get government
services (at least not without paying intermediaries).

---------------------------------------
Five - Insist on Democratic Credentials
---------------------------------------

11. (C) Senior GBRV leaders insist that "participatory"

democracy is superior to "representative" democracy. They
contend that real democracies give priority to "social
rights" and argue that concepts such as checks and balances
and institutional autonomy are discredited "bourgeois"
concepts. Chavez also regularly stresses that he has held
national elections almost yearly since he was first elected
in 1998, blurring any distinction between being elected
democratically and governing democratically. Anxious to
preserve their democratic legitimacy at home and abroad,
Chavez and senior GBRV officials lash out immediately and
disproportionately to any criticism of GBRV abuses. They
traditionally dismiss any criticism as interference in
Venezuela's domestic affairs and insult or try to discredit
any government or organization that faults the GBRV (without
ever engaging on the substance of the critique). The GBRV
forcibly expelled a Human Rights Watch leader and a member of
the European Parliament when they publicly took issue with
the GBRV's human rights record while in Caracas.

------------------------------------
Six - Reward Loyalty Over Competence
------------------------------------

12. (C) The single most important common characteristic of
Chavez's ministers and other senior officials is their
unquestioning loyalty to the Venezuelan president. He tends
to rotate a small coterie of firm supporters through senior
positions, simultaneously rewarding his inner circle while
preventing them from accruing either real expertise or an
independent power base. A substantial portion of Chavez's
appointed officials participated in his failed 1992 military
coup. Moreover, Chavez retains loyalists despite their poor
administrative or electoral track records. He named
Diosadado Cabello, who last year lost his re-election for the
Miranda Governorship, to be Minister of Infrastructure and
Telecommunications. Chavez appointed Jessie Chacon
Information Minister after he lost the mayoral race in the
Sucre borough of Caracas. By contrast, Chavez's PSUV
temporarily expelled Henri Falcon, the then widely hailed
competent mayor of Barquisimeto, only to quickly reinstate
him after it became obvious that Falcon would win the
governorship of Lara State in 2008 with or without the PSUV's
endorsement.

---------------------------
Seven - Repress Selectively
---------------------------

13. (C) The GBRV picks its political victims carefully,
making examples of sector leaders. Such calibrated
repression has so far avoided any significant public backlash
while at the same time created a climate of fear in civil
society and fostered self-censorship in the media. Examples
abound. The GBRV recently pressed corruption charges against
Maracaibo Mayor and 2006 consensus opposition presidential
candidate Manuel Rosales; Rosales fled to Peru where he was
granted asylum. The GBRV jailed Carlos Ortega, the leader of
the largest opposition trade union confederation. He escaped
from military prison in 2006 and was also granted asylum in
Peru. The GBRV closed the only critical free-to-air
television network in 2007 and is threatening to do the same
to opposition-oriented cable news network Globovision.
Prominent electoral NGO Sumate has been subject to numerous
government investigations. Chavez and other senior GBRV
officials have blasted prominent Catholic Church officials
for defending democracy, and pro-Chavez thugs briefly
occupied the Cardinal's residence in downtown Caracas.

----------------------------------
Eight - Create Parallel Structures
----------------------------------

14. (C) Over the last ten years, the GBRV and its supporters
and allies have created new bodies and institutions in an
effort to undermine and outflank organizations that it could
neither control nor co-opt. Domestically, the GBRV and its
adherents have spawned pro-government NGOs, business groups,
labor unions, television and radio networks, and even a
socialist spin-off of the Catholic Church. Chavez's social
programs ("misiones") generally sidestep and starve long
established government ministries of resources.
Internationally, Chavez is endeavoring to establish
multilateral organizations that both magnify Venezuela's
influence and combat purported "U.S. imperialism." From the
GBRV's perspective, ALBA, Petrocaribe, UNASUR, and the Bank
of the South are tools with which to supplant or weaken the
OAS, IMF, and the World Bank.

-------------------------
Nine - Party Equals State
-------------------------

15. (C) Since creating the United Socialist Party of
Venezuela (PSUV) in 2007, President Chavez has been trying to
forge a one-party state. Chavez uses government resources,
especially state media, and pressures the over two million
government employees to support the Venezuelan president,
PSUV candidates, and his referendum proposals during
elections. The National Electoral Council (CNE) staffs PSUV
registration drives. Chavez demanded that all pro-government
parties join the PSUV, but three parties, the Communist Party
(PCV), Patria Para Todos (PPT), and the Podemos party,
declined. Podemos later joined the opposition in 2007. The
PSUV declined to support any PPT or PCV gubernatorial and
mayoral candidates in the 2008 state and local elections and
neither party now exercises any meaningful local power.
Moreover, the National Assembly is seriously considering an
electoral law that would almost certainly expand the PSUV's
absolute legislative majority and diminish the influence of
the PPT and PCV after the 2010 parliamentary elections.

----------------------------
Ten - Monopolize Nationalism
----------------------------

16. (C) Calling himself the heir to Venezuelan founder Simon
Bolivar, Chavez asserts exclusive claim to Venezuela's
forefathers and national symbols. He regularly cites Bolivar
and other national heroes out of context, insisting that they
were early socialists. One of Chavez's stock stump speech
messages is that his Bolivarian Revolution liberated
Venezuela from being an American colony and will make
Venezuela a world power in coming decades. In contrast,
Chavez and his supporters depict the opposition as
unpatriotic, stateless, or paid U.S. agents. Chavez's own
exaggerated demonstrations of patriotism conveniently
distract public attention from local problems or demonstrate
incontrovertibly that he can do what he wants. In 2006,
Chavez added a star to the Venezuelan flag and flipped the
horse on the national seal to make it run left, not right.
In 2007, he eliminated three zeros from the currency and
changed its name from "bolivars" to "strong bolivars." He
also added the prefix "People's Power" to all ministries and
ordered all Venezuelan clocks changed by thirty minutes to
create a unique Venezuelan time zone. In 2008, he suggested
that he would exhume Bolivar's body to prove that he was
poisoned (He has not done so yet).

-------
Comment
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17. (C) The increasingly authoritarian nature of Chavismo,
not to mention its habitual and politically convenient
vilification of the United States, pose considerable
challenges to any effort to improve bilateral ties. Chavez
and other senior GBRV officials publicly express interest in
greater dialogue with the USG, but the reality is that to
date, the GBRV has been reluctant to create meaningful and
easily accessible channels of communication, let alone engage
substantively on issues that should be of common interest.
The GBRV also makes it clear that it will not accept or look
past any USG criticism, however well-founded or required by
congressionally-mandated reports or testimony. Facing no
checks on his power at home, Chavez craves international
attention and influence abroad. Whether it is funneling arms
and money to the FARC, sending suitcases of money to the
Kirchner campaign in Argentina, or exporting elements of
Chavismo to ALBA countries, to name just a few prominent
examples, Chavez's outsized ambition backed by petrodollars
makes Venezuela an active and intractable U.S. competitor in
the region.

14 defenders of liberty were crushed to death as the Soviet tanks advanced.

These people were unarmed civilians. Just like the ones who deposed the dictator of Tunisia two days ago. There is no doubt that many, many more lives would have been lost if they had chosen an armed struggle. What the Baltic peoples demonstrated to the world, was that even in the face of a cynical dictatorship an unarmed united people cannot be defeated.

The background to the event was that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia had declared themselves independent from the Soviet Union. Their countries were still occupied by Soviet forces, so the people stood guard around all important buildings 24/7, including this biting cold night 20 years ago. They came from all over the country, a friend of mine said she had a feeling something would happen and took the train from Kaunas to Vilnius after work, to stand guard rather than sleep.

In the following months Liucija Baskauskas told her audience, every day, not to let themselves be intimidated into silence but to keep talking about what they had seen that night. In fact, she asked them to write down their eyewitness accounts and to send them to the TV show. They got over 3,000 accounts of what had happened that faithful night. The stories were typed in a computer database, and the letters destroyed to avoid that they fell in the hands of KGB.

The database was smuggled out to Sweden, in a KGB vehicle, and that’s where I met them. Finally the hard disk of the computer was destroyed to eliminate the risk that it was decoded by KGB. This happened a couple of weeks before the coup d’État in Moscow, an expected event. Luckily something unexpected happened, and that was when Boris Yeltsin (perhaps after having too much vodka?) climbed up on that tank and gave a speech which changed the course of history, making him president of Russia.

May God bless all those who gave their life for freedom that night. They changed the course of history for the better, for all of us.

La fecha del sueño ese fue hoy, el 15 de enero de 2011. Al despertar, me recordé otro sueño, que tuve el 11 de marzo de 1995: Una mujer desapareció frente a mis ojos, volvió invisible. Un voz decía a la mujer a mi lado que tiene que cambiar el mundo dentro de 12 horas, o nunca más en su vida se iba a disfrutar de la presencia de la mujer vuelta invisible.

Queda obvio que los dos sueños se tratan de la misma tema. Doce horas, doce años, lo importante es el número doce, no la unidad. ¿Pero quien es la mujer que desaparece?

Ayer escuché la noticia que Chepe Fortuna había sido prohibido en Venezuela, ya que en esa novela colombiana un perrito se llama Huguito y la dueña del perro, Venezuela. Allá está la interpretación, que el país sea representada por una mujer, como en el Statue of Liberty.

La mujer que volvió invisible, la niña que desapareció y cuya cara fue cubierto en el cuadro, era la Venezuela libre, la Venezuela democrática.

El número doce se refiere a los doce años en poder de Hugo Chávez. Ya sabemos que no tiene ninguna intención de dejar el poder no importa los comicios en 2012. Para detener la dictadura el pueblo tiene que actuar ahora, antes que se ha consolidado por completo. Chávez fue inaugurado como presidente el 2 de febrero, 1999. Falta 15 días para cumplir 12 años.

Curiosidades: Hugo Chávez fue liberado el 27 de marzo de 1994 después del fracasado golpe militar en 1992. Poco después del sueño en 1995 el avión en lo cual viajé aterrizó brevemente en Caracas. Es lo único que he visto de ese país.

The graffiti reads, "We'll meet the 23rd" (uploaded Jan 7, 2011).

The protest will be carried out from 10 AM to noon in Caracas as well as in cities all over the country. Supporting demonstrations will be held the same day in Paris, New York, Boston, Miami, Madrid, Lima, Washington, Buenos Aires, Managua, Guatemala City, Tegucigalpa, Panama, Rome, Bologna, Los Angeles, Vienna, London, Sao Paolo, Guayaquil, Asuncion, Santiago, and Sydney.

The protest is organized by a large number of organizations in cooperation. The theme is “Detengamos la dictadura en Venezuela”. There will be no speeches or marches, just a mass gathering in Caracas, between Chacaito station and Parque del Este, along Avenida Fransisco de Miranda. This is about 6 km due east of the presidential palace, Miraflores.

Background, in Spanish: Declaration by laywers, declaration by the Catholic church in Venezuela, letter from the opposition to the Organization for American States (OAS).

Venezuelas folkvalde president Hugo Chávez har utnyttjat demokratin för att komma till makten. Väl där har han nu monterat ner hela det demokratiska systemet och ersatt det med en kommunistisk diktatur. Detta efter att han förlorat parlamentsvalen i september. Förlorat och förlorat, hans grupp fick 48% av rösterna men 60% av mandaten. Tillräckligt lite för att få honom att släppa den demokratiska fasaden och klart styra åt det diktatoriska håll som hans belackare i 11 år har varnat för var hans verkliga mål.

Ända sedan Chávez misslyckade statskupp 1992 mot den socialdemokratiska presidenten Carlos Andrés Perez (han dog på juldagen i fjol) har hans maktambitioner varit kända, men ändå lyckades han bli vald till president 1998.

Efter valförlusten den 26 september 2010 såg Chávez till att den utgående kongressen gav honom rätt att styra med dekret, samtidigt som den förbjöd riksdagsmännen att rösta efter sitt samvete. De ersatte vidare alla regionala och lokala valda församlingar med toppstyrda “kommuner” enligt sovjet-modell, och skapade 10 militärstyrda områden i landet. Plus ungefär 20 ytterligare lagar som alla i varierande grad undergräver demokrati, yttrandefrihet och rättsstat.

Chávez idol är Fidel Castro. I presidentpalatset, Miraflores, finns en ledningscentral, ett “war room” för propaganda, som är bemannat med kubaner under direkt befäl av Kubas vicepresident kommandant Valdes, enligt uppgifter från den demokratiska motståndsrörelsen i Venezuela. Valdes tillhör det gamla gardet; han slogs med Fidel och Raúl Castro i Sierra Madre. Deras mantra är permanent revolution. Men vad är då trotskistisk bolshevism?

Bolshevism är den form av kommunism som menar att ändamålen helgar medlen – precis som Chávez och hans kubanska “rådgivare”. I revolutionens namn är det inte ett brott att konfiskera egendom från revolutionens fiender. I fjol hungerstrejkade en bonde sig till döds för att få tillbaka sin gård. Det är klasskamp av klassiskt slag som gäller i Venezuela år 2011.

Trotskij menade, till skillnad från Stalin, att revolutionen först skulle spridas till andra länder, innan den konsoliderades i det egna landet. Just detta har Chávez och hans kubanska “rådgivare” gjort i åratal. Venezuelas oljemiljoner har använts dels till att hålla Kuba flytande (efter att Sovjet kollapsade blev ju Kuba utan sitt understöd, så där kom Chávez valseger i Venezuela väl till pass), dels till att sprida revolutionen till Ecuador, Bolivia, Honduras, och att få gamle revolutionären och diktatorn Ortega vald i Nicaragua.

I samtliga fall är processen likartad. Hjälp en presidentkandidat ekonomiskt med valkampanjen. Typ Manuel Zelaya i Honduras, han fick 50 miljoner. När han blivit vald erbjuds han att köpa olja med 50% på kredit. De femtio procenten ges dock inte som lån till landet, utan till presidenten, eller snarare presidentämbetet. Han kan använda de pengarna totalt utanför budgeten. Naturligtvis vore det landsförräderi och mutbrott i Sverige, men i Latinamerika är det inte så strikt med lagar och sånt. I gengäld måste presidenten göra en sak för Castro genom Chávez: Hålla en konstituerande grundlagsförsamling.

Orsaken till att det skall vara en konstituerande grundlagsförsamling och inte en redigering på laglig väg i kongressen är ganska säkert att det blir lättare att sätta in pålitliga personer i processen, och skapa ett dokument som är till uppdragsgivarens belåtenhet.

I Honduras förstod folk vartåt det lutade och stoppade Zelaya i tid (trots att den amerikanske ambassadören av allt att döma intrigerade för att hjälpa Zelaya, Chávez, och därmed Castro). Han avsattes, och demokratin räddades. Åtminstone tills vidare, för det utövas starka påtryckningar på den nye folkvalde presidenten att sätta sig över domstolsväsendet och starta en process som i förlängningen leder till den där konstituerade grundlagsförsamlingen. Bland de länder som utövar dessa påtryckningar finns naturligtvis Kuba och Venezuela, samt de andra köpta länderna (Nicaragua, Ecuador, Bolivia), men också märkligt nog USA.

Varför USA tar denna sida i konflikten kan jag bara gissa. Att ambassadören i Honduras spelar under täcket är en möjlighet. Att det är i USAs intresse är en annan, men i så fall offrar man cyniskt Honduras demokrati för att få tillgång till Venezuelas olja (10% av USAs oljeförbrukning härrör från Venezuela), och kanske för att hindra en öppen konflikt med Chávez som skulle kunna leda till att kommunismen sprids till ännu fler länder i Latinamerika. Det är i så fall ett vanskligt spel. Varför spela så högt?

Anledningen vore säkerligen att USA inte längre är berett att spela “bad cop”, med Europa som “good cop”. Priset för det kan ses som för högt för Obama. Han kan ha valt en taktik att ligga lågt tills Europa tar sitt ansvar.

Det ironiska är att EU länge uttryckt önskemål om att spela en viktigare roll i världspolitiken. Men nu, när deras röst verkligen behövs, så hörs bara tystnad.

Var finns fördömandet av att Hugo Chávez gjort sig till envåldshärskare?

Var finns det moraliska stödet till de demokratiska krafterna i Venezuela?

Var finns insikten att Chávez och Castro är allierade med Iran, Vitryssland, Ryssland, Syrien, och att dessa håller på att bygga upp ett världsomspännande imperium av diktaturer med kopplingar till knarksmuggling och terrorism?

Om EU kan uttala ett klart stöd, så ökar det väsentligt sannolikheten för att demokratin vinner. Det finns nämligen en opposition även inom den styrande gruppen, riktad mot att landets rikedomar går utomlands medan de egna innevånarna får det allt sämre (bortsett då från regimens stödtrupper så att säga.) Det finns också ett starkt motstånd inom militären mot den påtvingade utländska kontrollen och de kommunistiska idealen. Men framför allt finns det en organiserad motståndsrörelse under kommandant Panela, som kämpar för att avsätta Hugo Chávez med alla till buds stående fredliga medel.

Motståndsrörelsens mål är alltså att med icke-våldsmetoder tvinga ut Chávez och kubanerna från Miraflores. Målet är att återinföra demokratin och respekten för grundlagen. För tydlighets skull vill jag säga, att eftersom regimen uttryckligen anser att deras “revolution” är viktigare än motståndarnas mänskliga rättigheter, så finns det en uppenbar risk för att de helt enkelt slår ner den demokratiska motståndsrörelsen med militärt övervåld. Därför förbehåller sig motståndsrörelsen rätten att försvara sig om de blir anfallna. Deras uttalade förhoppning är dock att militären helt enkelt skall förhålla sig passiv.

Via mellanhänder har jag varit i kontakt med kommandant Panela, och kan vidarebefordra en begäran att Sverige och de övriga EU-länderna klart fördömer införandet av diktatur i Venezuela, och uppmuntrar till en fredlig återgång till demokrati i enlighet med grundlagen – vilken i sin sista paragraf faktiskt säger att det är alla medborgares skyldighet att återetablera respekten för grundlagen om den bryts.

Då Honduras slog tillbaka det kommunistiska anfallet 2009 var det en liten delseger. Om Venezuela kan göra samma sak nu så vore det en oändligt mycket större seger för demokratin, för det är Venezuela som är den ekonomiska drivkraften i alla kommunistiska projekt i Latinamerika för närvarande. Även Kuba kan stå på fallrepet snart om Venezuelas diktatur faller. Detta skulle vara en enorm vinst för världens säkerhet och framtida fred. Så hjälp till att sprida informationen är du snäll!